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THE MOST DANGEROUS JUSTICE:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF MATHEMATICS*
PAUL H. EDELMAN** & JIM CHEN***
ABSTRACT
We analyze the relative voting power of the Justices based upon
Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October
Term 1995. We take two approaches, both based on ideas derived
from cooperative game theory. One of the measures we use has been
used in connection with voting rights cases. After naming the Most
Dangerous Justice, we conclude by identifying and explaining the in-
verse relationship between seniority and voting power.
I. OF POWER AND PROPORTIONALITY
Who is the most dangerous Supreme Court Justice? Or, speaking
more generally, what makes any one Justice on a Court of equals a bit
more equal than the others?1 In an ironic twist for an institution that
turned "one person, one vote" into a bedrock constitutional princi-
ple,2 the Justices apparently do not cast votes of equal weight. Virtu-
ally every observer of the Court believes that certain Justices are more
powerful-or more dangerous, if you prefer-than their counterparts.
The belief is widespread; the proof, somewhat harder to find. If ful-
filled, however, the quest for the root of Supreme Court voting power
can prove quite rewarding, for the question of relative influence
* Cf. loosely ALEXANDER M. BicKE., THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SuPREMF
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITCs (1962).
** Professor of Mathematics, University of Minnesota <edelnan@math.umn.edu>.
*** Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota <chenx064C@,naroon.tc.umn.
edu>. Lee Epstein, Daniel A. Farber, Philip P. Frickey, Daniel J. Gifford, Suzanna Sherry, Max-
well L. Steams, and Eugene Volokh supplied helpful suggestions. Emily E. Flynn provided ca-
pable research assistance.
1. Cf. GEORGE ORwELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946) ("all animals are equal but some ani-
mals are more equal than others").
2. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,558 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
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among the Justices holds the keys to the far more complex and elusive
questions of judicial greatness 3 and judicial obscurity.4
Hypotheses on Supreme Court voting power fall into two broad
categories. The first ascribes the power differential to discrepancies in
political savvy, as epitomized by Bob Woodward and Scott Arm-
strong's depiction of William Brennan as an ideologically outnum-
bered but stunningly effective liberal member of the Burger Court.5
This hypothesis portrays the powerful Justice as an active strategist,
one who can leverage himself or herself into a position of greater in-
fluence regardless of the Justices' collective ideology. At an extreme,
the Justice as strategist can assemble a coalition so improbable that
the resulting majority opinion lacks any doctrinal coherence.
A second hypothesis posits that certain Justices cast relatively
weightier votes simply by virtue of their ideological position within
the Court. This hypothesis assumes that a moderate Justice can gain
greater influence merely by being a passive swing voter. Moderates
such as Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and Sandra Day O'Connor are often per-
ceived to have cast the fifth and decisive vote in closely contested
cases. Under this view, the "median Justice" is the Court's equivalent
of other political institutions' "median legislator,"'7 whose preferences
dictate the overarching institutional preferences of the voting body.8
3. See generally RIcHARD A. POSNER, CARwozo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990) (de-
veloping a portrait of an important legal mind and a model for a new kind of study assessing a
judicial career).
4. See generally David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50
U. Cm. L. REv. 466 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant Justice: Further Evi-
dence, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 481 (1983).
5. See BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, T-E BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT passim (1979).
6. See Mark Tushnet, The Optimist's Tale, 132 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1257, 1263 (1984) (describ-
ing Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), in precisely these
terms).
7. See, eg., George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions":
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative
History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 61-64; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I,
Section 7 Game, 80 GEo. L.J. 523, 528-29 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Foreword. Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26,33 n.24
(1994); Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests, 75 MINN. L. REv. 667, 689
(1991); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REv. 423, 436-37 (1988).
8. For further clarifications and criticisms of the method of measuring institutional prefer-
ences through a real or hypothetical "median voter," see MAXwELL L. STEARNS, PuntLc
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW. READINGS AND COMMENTARY 126-29 (1997); Randall G. Holcombe,
An Empirical Test of the Median Voter Model, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 260 (1980); Harold Hotelling,
Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J., 41, 42-57 (1981); Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal,
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In his day, Justice Powell, as the Court's "swing voter," played a
prominent role in several highly visible constitutional controversies.
In two of the Burger Court's best known constitutional decisions, he
punctuated his decisive vote with opinions so moderate that they per-
suaded none of his colleagues.9 On today's Court, Sandra Day
O'Connor has perfected the role of the "median Justice."'10 She sin-
glehandedly unites the "active strategist" and "passive swing voter"
theories of Supreme Court voting. Evidently it takes more than fortu-
itous political positioning to become the architect of Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena," Shaw v. Reno,"2 Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,13 City of Richmond v. . A.
Croson Co., 4 and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.'5
Whereas Justice Powell may be better remembered for staking out
unique legal ground,16 Justice O'Connor has actively united working
coalitions in some of the Court's most prominent decisions. Whether
or not these opinions articulate a discernibly "feminine voice"
in her constitutional opinions,'7 one aspect of Justice O'Connor's
legacy lies beyond dispute. She is the Court's consummate
"accommodationist."' s
No matter how intuitively attractive and seemingly accurate,
these hypotheses about Supreme Court voting remain just that, and
the evidence marshaled on their behalf has been entirely anecdotal.
We now propose a rigorous analysis of voting patterns on the
The Elusive Median Voter, 12 J. PuB. ECON. 143 (1979); Charles K. Rowley, The Relevance of the
Median Voter Theorem, 140 J. INsr. & TmEORTCAL ECON. 104 (1984).
9. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J., announcing the
judgment of the Court); see also JOHN C. JEniums, JR., JuSTrCE LEwIS F. POWELL, JR. 526
(1994) ("In Bakke, Powell found a way to translate his conviction into a legal judgment and in so
doing to dominate the decision of a divided Court. But in Bowers he did just the opposite ....
muffling his own quite different views in a throwaway concurrence.").
10. See, eg., DAvID G. SAVAGE, TuRNlo RiGrr: TBE MAKNG OF THE RE-HNQIUIsT
SuPREmE CouRT 225 (1992) (describing O'Connor as the Court's "pivotal Justice" who "held
the balance on abortion, affirmative action, religion, and the death penalty").
11. 115 S. Ct 2097 (1995).
12. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
13. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
14. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
15. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
16. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring); cases cited supra
note 9.
17. See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986).
18. See NANcy MAvEETY, JusrxcE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE
SumPEm COURT (1996).
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Supreme Court in order to test these widely held beliefs about the
relative influence of individual Justices.
Part II of this Article identifies all winning coalitions of Justices
during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995-that is, all sets of
five or more Justices who joined a single opinion in any case during
those Terms. (Our analysis begins with the 1994 Term because it was
the first Term in which all of the current Justices-Rehnquist, Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer-
served together.) We define a measure of voting strength based solely
on the record of the Justices' voting alignments, without resorting to
subjective and error-prone guesses about the Justices' political
proclivities.
Mindful of the limits on the data available from one or two terms
of the court, we then use these data in Part III to interpolate what all
of the possible voting coalitions might be. We then extend the theory
of cooperative games to derive a voting index based on these (and
only these) putative coalitions. In Part IV of this Article, we an-
nounce the results of our two models and crown the Most Dangerous
Justice. Oddly enough, the junior Justices seem to outvote their col-
leagues. In Part V, we address the apparent inverse relationship be-
tween voting power and seniority and speculate on possible
explanations for this peculiar phenomenon.
II. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT JUSTICE:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
In building our basic model of Supreme Court voting, we take a
naive look at the winning coalitions of Justices from October Term
1994, October Term 1995, and the two Terms taken together. We then
construct a voting power index based solely on that information. The
key idea is that the only time that an individual Justice's vote matters
is when he is in a coalition of exactly five Justices. In such a coalition,
the defection of any one Justice would make losers of the other four.
Since each Justice is as much a "swing voter" as any of the others in
this fragile coalition of five, voting power is equally distributed among
the prevailing Justices (twenty percent each).
Therefore, over a Term or a stretch of Terms, an individual Jus-
tice's voting power may be expressed as the percentage of the time
that the Justice is in a five-member coalition, less the eighty percent of
the voting power attributable to the four other members of each
coalition. We count only the number of times in which a particular
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Justice appears in any five-Justice coalition. We do not take into ac-
count the number of cases decided by any particular coalition. This
method allows us to measure how the Court's "coalitional deep struc-
ture," or the plausibility of particular coalitions among the Justices,
affects voting power. In other words, we are more interested in a par-
ticular Justice's ability to form coalitions with certain other Justices
than in the number of cases that any single coalition happens to de-
cide during a Supreme Court Term.
We deliberately reject one aspect of cooperative game theory as it
is conventionally used to measure differences in power within a voting
system. Most such applications of game theory assume that coalitions
may freely form within any given population of voters. In other
words, game-theoretic analyses of voting typically assume that the
probability that any given coalition of voters will emerge depends only
on the size of the coalition.19 We have chosen to abandon this as-
sumption. The crux of our analysis lies in the number of different co-
alitions that any single Justice has actually joined or is theoretically
capable of joining, based on extrapolations from that Justice's voting
record.
In certain voting systems, not all possible coalitions will form.
The Supreme Court is one such system; so are most legislative elec-
tions in the United States. The Court itself has acknowledged that the
usual rules of pluralist democracy do not apply in electoral situations
scarred by racial bloc voting.20 A pattern "showing that a significant
number of minority group members usually vote for the same candi-
dates" not only proves "political cohesiveness" within that group;
when coupled with evidence of a countervailing (and usually super-
vening) "white bloc vote," racial bloc voting suggests that certain mul-
tiethnic coalitions are simply implausible.21
Likewise, in an ideologically fractured Supreme Court, certain
coalitions among the Justices are more likely than others, and some
19. Specifically, the Shapley-Shubik index assumes that every linear ordering of voters is
equally likely, whereas the Banzhaf index assumes that every possible coalition is equally likely.
See generally ALAN D. TAYLOR, MATHEMATICS AND POLITICS: STRATmGY, VOTnNG, POwER AND
PROOF 63-90, 205-37 (1995); Philip D. Straffn, Jr., Power Indices in Politics, in 2 MODULES IN
APPLIED MATnEMATcs: PoLmcAL AND RELATED MODELS 256,262-68 (Steven J. Brains, Wil-
liam F. Lucas & Philip D. Straffin, Jr. eds., 1983). For a more complete explanation of the
Shapley-Shubik index, see infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. For a more complete expla-
nation of the Banzhaf index, see infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
20. See, eg., Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46-61 (1986).
21. Id. at 56; accord Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507
U.S. 146, 157 (1993).
1996]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:63
may be entirely implausible. (The educated naysayer can name
oddball cases such as Texas v. Johnson' and Harper v. Virginia De-
partment of Taxation,23 but there is a reason these cases are oddball
cases.)24 Any given coalition of Justices may be so ideologically in-
compatible that there is no conceivable legal issue on which these Jus-
tices and these Justices alone, to the exclusion of their colleagues, will
agree. 5 Even if we ignore ideology, the Court's actual voting patterns
should persuade us that not all possible coalitions will emerge on the
Court, that some blocs simply will not form. There are exactly 126
combinations of five Justices (or working majorities, if you prefer) on
a Court of nine Justices.26 As we report in Tables 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 be-
low, only eleven such coalitions, or fewer than a tenth of all theoreti-
cally possible five-Justice alliances, actually appeared in the 1994
Term, and even fewer appeared in the 1995 Term. We will therefore
suspend the traditional game-theoretic assumption that all potential
coalitions among Supreme Court Justices are equally likely.
It is possible, of course, to base a quantitative analysis of the
Supreme Court's voting patterns not only on the number of different
coalitions, but also on the number of cases that each different coali-
tion decides. For example, in its tabulation of each Term's 5-4 deci-
sions, the Harvard Law Review's annual survey of the Supreme Court
reports the number of decisions decided by each different five-Justice
coalition. 7 Brigham Young University's annual survey of the Court
22. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (majority opinion by Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun,
Scalia, & Kennedy, JJ.).
23. 509 U.S. 86 (1993) (majority opinion by Thomas, J., joined by Blackmun, Stevens,
Scalia, & Souter, JJ.).
24. Both Johnson and Harper united the Court's "liberal" and "conservative" blocs, largely
to the exclusion of moderate and moderately conservative Justices. See Maxwell L. Steams,
Standing and Social Choice; Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. Rlv. 309, 356 (1995) (describing
multipeaked political preferences in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts according to three polt-
ical blocs: liberal, moderate, and conservative). According to Maxwell Steams, standing doc-
trine provides the Court an endogenous rule by which to defer decisions on the merits of such
"politically divisive rulings." See id. at 363. Thus, cases that tend toward oddball alignments of
Justices are prime candidates for dismissal for want of standing.
25. We propose the following parlor game for Supreme Court junkies. Given any unique
coalition of Justices, construct a case in which that coalition will vote to affirm and all of the
other Justices will vote to reverse.
26. The number of five-Justice combinations on the Supreme Court is:
9!
4! - 5!
27. See, eg., The Supreme Court, 1994 Term - Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. RP'V. 111,343
(1995) [hereinafter 1994 Harvard Survey]; The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110
HAv. L. REv. 135, 370 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Harvard Survey].
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explicitly counts the number of apparent "swing votes" a particular
Justice casts during a Term rather than the number of different
coalitions that a Justice seems capable of joining.2 This methodology
does measure the individual Justices' proclivity to cast "swing votes"
in a crucial sense. The more often a coalition comes together, the
more thoroughly it reinforces the perception that its members are act-
ing as a cohesive "bloc."
For instance, consider the Justices most widely believed to be the
five most conservative members of today's Court. According to the
Harvard Law Review, the coalition consisting of William Rehnquist,
Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clar-
ence Thomas combined to render at least six 5-4 decisions during the
1994 Term29 and as many as seven during the 1995 TermA0 But the
only way to tell whether Justice Kennedy or Justice Thomas is more
likely to defect from this bloc is to study these Justices' demonstrated
ability to join other coalitions. Useful distinctions among individual
Justices' voting power thus depend less on the number of times a par-
ticular coalition is successful and more on the number of different co-
alitions that each individual Justice is ideologically able to join.
If all of the Justices had equal power, they each would possess
one-ninth of the Court's total voting power, or approximately 11.1%.
To express this baseline in somewhat different terms, we would expect
each Justice to appear in five-ninths of the five-Justice coalitions on a
Court where all coalitions were plausible. Divided by five, this rate of
participation would yield a power rating of 11.1 for each Justice.
Eleven distinct five-Justice coalitions formed during the 1994
Term. Nine were identified in the Harvard Law Review's list of
5-4 decisions;31 we have added two coalitions in order to reflect
28. See, eg., Richard G. Wilkins, Scott M. Petersen, Matthew K. Richards & Ronald J.
Tocchini, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23 HASTiNGS CoNsr. L.Q. 1, 27, 43-46
(1995).
29. See 1994 Harvard Survey, supra note 27, at 343. This coalition arguably decided a sev-
enth case in the 1994 Term. See infra note 36.
30. Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996); Bow-
ersox v. Williams, 116 S. Ct. 1312 (1996) (per curiam); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996); wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S. Ct. 7 (1995) (per curiam); Netherland v. Tuggle, 116 S. Ct.
4 (1995) (per curiam); see also Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174,2178-84 (1996) (Scalia, J., writing
for himself, Rehnquist, CJ., and O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., in part II of his opinion).
31. See 1994 Harvard Survey, supra note 27, at 343.
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disagreements that had the potential to alter the precedential value of
the majority opinion in a significant way.3"
TABLE 2.1.1: FIVE-JUSTICE COALITIONS DURING
THE 1994 TERM
1. Rehmquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter33
2. Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg34
3. Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyei-35
4. Rehmquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas36
5. Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, Breyer37
6. Relmquist, Scalia Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsbur 8
7. Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breye 3 9
8. Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer4 0
9. Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer41
10. Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg42
32. In Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995), Justices Scalia
and Thomas concurred in the five-Justice majority's judgment that "Oklahoma's tax on the sale
of transportation services does not contravene the Commerce Clause." Id. at 1346. But these
Justices' concurrence in the judgment rested on their clear and legally significant declaration that
the precedent invoked by the Court, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977),
deserved "its rightful place... among the other useless and discarded tools of [the Court's]
negative-Commerce-Clause jurisprudence." 115 S. Ct. at 1346 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995), a single defection from the ma-
jority's 5-3 margin of decision would have resulted in an affirmance of the decision below by an
equally divided vote. See also id. at 827 (noting that Scalia, J., took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case). The resulting per curiam affirmance not only would have eliminated a
substantive, fully reasoned opinion from United States Reports; it would have changed a partial
reversal of the Illinois Supreme Court into an across-the-board affirmance.
33. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995) (Kennedy, J.).
34. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995) (Souter, J.).
35. Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995) (Stevens, J.); Shalala v. Guernsey
Mem'l Hosp., 115 S. Ct. 1232 (1995) (Kennedy, J.).
36. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (Kennedy, J.);
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (Kennedy, J.); Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995)
(Rehnquist, C.J.); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (O'Connor, J.);
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.). Arguably, this coalition also decided Duncan v. Henry, 115 S. Ct.
887 (1995), a per curiam decision in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer concurred only
in the judgment, see id. at 888, and Justice Stevens dissented, see id.
37. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (O'Connor, J.).
38. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.).
39. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.).
40. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., joined by
O'Connor, J., in Parts I, II, III, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.).
41. Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995) (Souter, J.); Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851
(1995) (Stevens, J.).
42. Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995) (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., in Parts
I, II-A, II-C, III, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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11. Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 43
By contrast, October Term 1995 witnessed the formation of just
eight distinct five-Justice coalitions. The Harvard Law Review's sur-
vey of the 1995 Term identified seven of these coalitions. 4 We added
an eighth coalition that emerged in part of a complicated commercial
speech case.45
TABLE 2.1.2: FIVE-JUSTICE COALITIONS DURING
THE 1995 TERM
1. Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas"
2. Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas47
3. Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg4
4. Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer49
5. Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer50
6, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg5'
7. Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer52
8. O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer- 3
From these five-Justice coalitions, we derive the following power
indexes for the 1994 Term, the 1995 Term, and the two Terms in con-
junction. For each Justice in each set of ratings, we compute the
number of times that the Justice appeared in a five-Justice coalition,
divided by the total number of five-Justice coalitions in the relevant
time period, and multiplied by 20 (in order to reflect the assumption
43. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (Stevens, J.); United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (Stevens, J.); Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.).
44. See 1995 Harvard Survey, supra note 27, at 370.
45. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515 (1996) (Stevens, J., writ-
ing for himself and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., in part VIII of his opinion).
46. Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996) (Rehnquist, CJ.); Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S.
Ct. 2068 (1996) (per curiam); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.); Bowersox
v. Williams, 116 S. Ct. 1312 (1996) (per curiam); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)
(Rehnquist, C.J.); Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S. Ct. 7 (1995) (per curiam); Netherland v. Tuggle,
116 S. Ct. 4 (1995) (per curiam); see also Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174,2178-84 (1996) (Scalia,
J., writing for himself, Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., in part II of
his opinion).
47. Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996) (O'Connor, J.).
48. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (Rehnquist, CJ.).
49. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (Stevens, J.).
50. Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. CL 1293 (1996) (Breyer, J.).
51. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515 (1996) (Stevens, J., writing
for himself and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., in part VIII of his opinion).
52. Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1396 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.); Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2241 (1996) (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., with respect to Parts I, II, III, V).
53. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.).
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that each Justice in a five-member coalition wields 20 percent of the
Court's power).
TABLE 2.2.1: SUPREME COURT POWER, 1994 TERM
Justice Power Index Power Quotient
Rehnquist 12.7 114
Stevens 12.7 114
O'Connor 9.1 82
Scalia 7.3 66
Kennedy 16.4 148
Souter 10.9 98
Thomas 5.5 50
Ginsburg 14.5 131
Breyer 10.9 98
TABLE 2.2.2: SUPREME COURT POWER, 1995 TERM
Justice Power Index Power Quotient
Rehnquist 7.5 68
Stevens 10.0 90
O'Connor 15.0 135
Scalia 10.0 90
Kennedy 12.5 113
Souter 15.0 135
Thomas 7.5 68
Ginsburg 12.5 113
Breyer 10.0 90
TABLE 2.2.3: SUPREME COURT POWER, 1994 AND
1995 TERMS
Justice Power Index Power Quotient
Rehnquist 12.0 108
Stevens 10.7 96O'Connor 12.0 108
Scalia 8.0 72
Kennedy 14.7 132Souter 12.0 108
Thomas 6.7 60
Ginsburg 13.3 120
Breyer 10.7 96
Each power index expresses, in percentage terms, each Justice's share
of the Court's total voting power. If the Justices shared power
equally, each would have an index of 11.1. The power quotient ex-
presses each Justice's power relative to his or her pro rata share of the
Court's voting power. It is computed by multiplying the power index
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by nine. A Justice with a power quotient of 100 enjoys exactly the
amount of power that he or she should expect to wield.
Our initial, naive computation suggests that not all of the Justices
are equal. To be sure, our crude measure of voting power raises a
number of objections. The first is that of sample size. The Court de-
cided only eighty-six cases in the 1994 Term and another eighty-six in
the 1995 Term, and relatively few of these cases were decided by five-
Justice coalitions. In a Court that hears so few cases and renders even
fewer close decisions,54 any given Term might not be representative of
the Justices' long-run workload.
Second, we have assumed that every Justice in a five-Justice coali-
tion is equally likely to defect. This assumption may not hold. Each
5-4 decision embodies a set of legal propositions with which all mem-
bers of the prevailing five-Justice majority agree and with which the
other Justices disagree. For a member of the winning coalition to de-
fect, there must be another set of propositions-whether in this con,
troversy or in another-that distinguishes the defecting Justice from
the other four. In short, there must be legal issues on which the de-
fecting Justice demonstrates the degree of ideological independence
needed to disagree with the other four Justices in the coalition.
Although this hypothetical set of legal propositions may exist in the
abstract, a case presenting those propositions might not come before
the Court (at least not within the Term in question).
We are assuming, of course, that the Justices vote strictly accord-
ing to legal principle and do not trade votes as though they were
so many horses at a swap meet. 5 The Justices are notorious, how-
ever, for switching votes at various points between their post-
argument conference and the final publication of their opinions.56 In
54. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv.
1093 (1987). Note that Strauss's rough count of cases heard each year by the Court has fallen
more than 40% in less than a decade.
55. But see Saul Brenner, Tony Caporale & Harold Winter, Fluidity and Coalition Sizes on
the Supreme Court, 36 Jutmsanucs J. 245, 253 (1996) ("[A] majority opinion writer might bar-
gain to obtain the votes of the dissenters .... He might, for example, agree to write the opinion
in such a way as to please the dissenting justices."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing
the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802, 821-22 (1982) (suggesting that majority rule on the Court may
be subverted by Justices who do not vote strictly according to their legal convictions); cf. WOOD-
Vmw & AR sTRorG, supra note 5, at 192 ("The Chief's Saturday visit to Blackmun, and Black-
mun's subsequent withdrawal of the abortion opinion, had spawned vicious rumors among the
clerks of vote trading.").
56. See, eg., Saul Brenner, Fluidity on the United States Supreme Court: A Reexamination,
24 AM. . Po. Sci. 526 (1980); Brenner et al., supra note 55; Robert H. Dorff & Saul Brenner,
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certain cases, Justices may and probably do submerge their own
views in order to create consensus,5 7 or at least a working major-
ity.58 Lacking. any method for tracing vote-swapping on the contem-
porary Court,5 9 we will rely exclusively on the final votes recorded in
the Court's published opinions.
To account for the possibility that certain groups of Justices are
too ideologically incompatible to coalesce, we might credit a Justice
with "swing vote" power within a particular five-Justice majority only
if the other four Justices in that majority could have formed a coali-
tion on their own. In other words, there must have been another
opinion during the same Term in which the other four Justices agreed.
If those four Justices have agreed in some other case, we may safely
conclude that the first Justice had the option to defect, since the other
Conformity Voting on the United States Supreme Court, 54 J. PoL 762 (1992); Timothy M. Hagle
& Harold J. Spaeth, Voting Fluidity and the Attitudinal Model of Supreme Court Decision Mak-
ing, 44 W. Po- Q. 119 (1991).
57. See, e.g., 'Tirner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2475 (1994) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (concurring in a "judgment vacating and
remanding for further proceedings" despite the Justice's own "view that we should affirm the
judgment" because a "vote to affirm" would mean that "no disposition of this appeal would
command the support of a majority of the Court"); Brenner et al., supra note 55, at 252 (finding
that Justices who switch votes gravitate toward majorities, especially unanimous ones, so much
so that "52.9% of the justices who began in the minority coalition at the conference vote" and
who change their votes "end with a unanimous majority"); Saul Brenner & Robert H. Dorff, The
Attitudinal Model and Fluidity Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A Theoretical Perspec-
tive, 4 J. THEoRETCAL Pot. 195, 198-200 (1992) (finding that Justices who shift from the minor-
ity to the majority usually do so not because they have changed their legal opinion, but because
they prefer to create consensus on the Court).
58. See Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term - Foreword: Freedom of Expres-
sion in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 72-73 (1980) (encouraging this practice, even at
the expense of heartfelt legal positions that otherwise would be expressed in dissents and in
opinions concurring in the judgment); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term -
Foreword. The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. Rnv. 84 (1959) (same); cf. Robert W.
Bennett, A Dissent on Dissent, 74 JUDICATURE 255 (1991) (criticizing the increasingly fashiona-
ble trend of concurring in the judgment as a symptom of a Court more inclined toward needless
nitpicking than collegial decisionmaking). On principled voting within the Supreme Court, see
generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82
(1986); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 834
CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1343-44 n.113, 1347-50 (1995).
59. Historians are able to reconstruct voting patterns on Terms long past by compiling
docket books, conference lists, case files, bench memos, and conference notes from the publicly
released files of deceased Justices. See generally, ag., JAN PALMER, THE VINSON COURT ERA:
THE SUPREME CouRT's CoNFEREN VOTES (1990). No such evidence is available for more
recent Terms, beginning with October Term 1992. Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers, however,
provide a window on cases as recent as the 1991 Term. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRmOE, JR. &
PInLip P. FRiCKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBUC PoucY 674 & n.1 (2d ed. 1995) (using Justice Marshall's papers to document the deliber-
ations underlying McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)).
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four have demonstrated elsewhere that they were capable of forming
a coalition.
The problem with this method is again one of small numbers.
There were few four-Justice coalitions in the 1994 Term and even
fewer in the 1995 Term.60 This is no accident. If a group of Justices is
already in the minority, there is very little incentive for all of them to
join a single dissenting opinion. They are likely to fracture into even
smaller groups,6' since there is little to be gained by compromising
one's views simply to reach a consensus.62
Finally, one might argue that our approach fails to draw a distinc-
tion between "important" and "unimportant" cases. In other words,
certain Justices may act with greater force in important or hard cases
than in cases at large. We find this objection unpersuasive. So far we
have focused solely on 5-4 decisions. Ostensibly the Harvard Law Re-
view's practice of tallying each Term's 5-4 decisions rests on the defen-
sible and arguably correct assumption that important cases tend to be
more closely contested than do unimportant cases. 63 If anything, our
method of evaluating voting power assigns greater weight to the "im-
portant" cases, at least to the extent such cases tend to divide the
Court. In any event, Part IV of this Article considers individual Jus-
tices' voting patterns in putatively important cases.
60. Ten and seven respectively, to be precise, or one fewer than the number of correspond-
ing five-Justice coalitions in each Term.
61. See, eg., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114,1133 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
id. at 1145 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S.
Ct. 994, 1003 (1996) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id. at 1010 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting); Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 870 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Ken-
nedy & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); id. at 874 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting);
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817,827 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 828 (O'Connor, J., joined in part by Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
62. See Brenner et al., supra note 55, at 252-53 (cataloguing institutional reasons that dis-
courage Justices from coalescing toward a losing legal position); cf. Ken Kimura, Note, A Legiti-
macy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CoRNELL L. REV. 1593, 1593 n.3,
1626-27 (1992) (identifying 103 plurality decisions - that is, cases not decided by a majority of
the Court - between October Term 1981 and October Term 1990 inclusive). The resulting aver-
age of 10.3 plurality decisions per Term during the 1980s vastly exceeds averages compiled in the
past: 8.8 per Term between 1970 and 1980, see Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decision-
making, 94 HAgv. L. Rlv. 1127, 1139 (1981); 3.0 between 1956 and 1969, see John F. Davis &
William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DuKE
L.J. 59, 60; and 0.29 between 1801 and 1955, see Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority
Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 99, 99 n.4 (1956).
63. See Brenner et al., supra note 55, at 253. Like the Brenner trio, "[w]e are not per-
suaded that any" quantitative measure can precisely "capture th[e] characteristic" of "'case diffi-
culty."' Id. at 253 n.15.
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We now confront all of these objections to our simple analysis by
employing a more sophisticated game-theoretic approach.
III. FINDING FEASIBILITY:
APPLYING COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
This Part outlines a more sophisticated game-theoretic approach
to determining the Justices' relative voting power. As an initial mat-
ter, we must overcome two problems. First, we must find a way to
extrapolate the theoretical set of all ideologically feasible coalitions
from the empirical set of coalitions that occur in a given Term. Sec-
ond, we must extend established game-theoretic voting indexes to this
more general situation.
A. THE FRANK-SHAPLEY INDEX OF SUPREME COURT POWER
Contemporary game-theoretic analysis of voting traces its origins
to the Shapley-Shubik index, a formula devised in 1954 to measure the
distribution of power in voting institutions.64 The Shapley-Shubik in-
dex contemplates a voting system with n voters. For every issue on
which the members of a particular institution might vote, one could
rank the voters in declining order of the intensity of their support,
from rabid advocates to lukewarm allies to unregenerate opponents.
In every such ordering of the voters, the person holding the winning
vote is the "pivot" (or, in the argot of public choice scholarship, the
"median voter" or "median legislator").65 The Shapley-Shubik index
of any given voter's power within the organization is the number of
preferential orderings in which that voter is pivotal, divided by n!, the
total number of such orderings. On the assumption that all preferen-
tial orderings are equally likely, a voter's power may be expressed as
the probability that he or she will be the pivot.66
The Shapley-Shubik index has yielded at least one attempt to an-
alyze Supreme Court voting through the lens of cooperative game the-
ory. Arthur Frank and Lloyd Shapley modeled the Justices' votes
64. See L.S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power
in a Committee System, 48 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 787 (1954).
65. See sources cited supra note 7.
66. For a more complete explanation of the Shapley-Shubik index and an application of
that index to Supreme Court voting, see Paul H. Edelman, A Note on Voting, MATH. Soc. Sci
(forthcoming 1997). The Shapley-Shubik index is technically more difficult to apply to the
Court, but its results are remarkably similar to those we generate through the index we develop
in this Article.
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during October Term 1977.67 For its time, this study represented a
significant breakthrough. The Harvard Law Review's contemporane-
ous survey of the Court contained no analysis of pivotal votes.68
Frank and Shapley considered how each Justice might prove "pivotal"
according to three distinct sets of ideological criteria: political prefer-
ences in the traditional "liberal/conservative" sense, judicial deference
to legislative prerogative, and judicial deference to governmental dis-
cretion in technically complex legal settings such as tax disputes.69 Af-
ter reducing each of these factors to an individual linear function,
Frank and Shapley used the three lines as the axes in a three-dimen-
sional space.70  Their three-factor analysis was a conscious effort to
measure "the distribution of power" in the Court as "a real political
institution," based on "prior knowledge of each [Justice's] ideological
attitudes or predilections. 71
Frank and Shapley's analysis yielded the following power index
for the Supreme Court's 1977 Term:72
TABLE 3.1: THE FRANK-SHAPLEY POWER INDEX,
1977 TERM
Justice Power Index
Burger .065
Brennan .033
Stewart .157
White .129
Marshall .080
Blackmun .092
Powell .346
Rehnquist .051
Stevens .047
67. See ARTHUR Q. FRANK & LLOYD SHAPLEY, Tim DIsTRIuUTIoN OF POWER IN THE U.S.
SuPREME COURT (A RAND Note, N-1735-NSF, RAND Corp. 1981).
68. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 327-39 (1978).
69. See FRANK & SHAPLEy, supra note 67, at 10-11.
70. In formal terms, Frank and Shapley's geometric approach used a principal factor analy-
sis that assigned positions to each of the Justices in 3-space. Each linear functional on 3-space
gave rise to a linear ordering of the Justices. The authors then assigned a value of 1 to the fifth
Justice in that order and 0 to all of the rest. Finally, they identified each linear functional with a
point on the 2-sphere and integrated over the sphere using the uniform probability distribution.
See id.
71. See id. at 1.
72. Frank and Shapley actually performed two different computations, based on two differ-
ent transformations of their data. Table 3.1, shown here, corresponds to Frank and Shapley's
Transformation 1. See id. at 23. The results are very similar for Transformation 2. See id.
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The Frank-Shapley power index may be compared directly with ours if
one multiplies the Frank-Shapley index by 100. Thus, Lewis Powell
boasted a voting index of 34.6 during the 1977 Term (more than three
times his pro rata share of the entire Court's voting power), whereas
William Brennan compiled a measly power index of 3.3 (less than a
third of his expected share).
The most startling aspect of the Frank-Shapley index is that Jus-
tice Powell was allocated over one-third of the entire Court's power.
This is difficult to believe.. It is particularly difficult to believe that
Justice Powell had roughly six times the power of the Chief Justice and
nine times the power of William Brennan, the master strategist of the
Burger Court. Even a simple review of the decisions from October
Term 1977 casts doubt on the vast power disparities reflected in the
Frank-Shapley index. For instance, Powell appeared in the majority
132 times while Burger appeared in the majority 126 times. When one
considers only five-Justice majorities, Powell appeared in twenty-one
and Burger in nineteen. These disparities dwindle further when one
considers only cases in which every Justice participated. For Powell,
the numbers change to ninety-one and thirteen; for Burger, they be-
come eighty-seven and thirteen. These relatively close numbers un-
dermine the credibility of the Frank-Shapley index.73
One weakness of the Frank-Shapley index may be traced to its
reliance on subjective judgments of the Justices' ideologies and of the
73. An application of our generalized Banzhaf index, which we describe in the next section
of this Article, to the 1977 Term yields figures in a tight band between 10.0 and 12.0 percent of
the Court's total voting power:
Burger 12.0
Brennan 11.2
Stewart 12.0
White 11.0
Marshall 11.2
Blackmun 11.6
Powell 11.2
Rehnquist 10.2
Stevens 10.0
Because of an extraordinary number of recusals in the 1977 Term, we used only those cases in
which every Justice participated. The noticeably narrower range of the power index in the 1977
Term may be attributable to the confluence of two factors. First, the Court's vastly larger docket
in that Term created opportunities for substantive disagreement in a larger number of cases.
This may have had the effect of moving the set of feasible coalitions toward the set of all possible
coalitions. Second, the contemporary Court's trend toward special concurrences and separate
dissents tends to atomize the Justices, see supra note 62, which in turn tends to create disparities
in voting power.
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political implications of particular case outcomes. Studies that at-
tempt to distinguish between "conservative" and "liberal" legal posi-
tions typically concede that these classifications may not "reflect
reality"-that it is emphatically the province and duty of "legal phi-
losophers and other pundits to debate which is the truly conservative
or liberal position." 74 Frank and Shapley compounded this problem
by using not one, but three, separate ideological scales in their study.
Moreover, the calibration of these ideological scales may have been
skewed by the coincidental emergence of certain high-profile legal dis-
putes during the 1977 Term, especially Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.75
Another weakness of the Frank-Shapley index is that it treats Jus-
tices who concur in a judgment the same way that it treats Justices
who concur in an opinion. While this methodology does shed light on
a Justice's power to influence the disposition of a particular case, it
misstates the Justice's role in shaping the collective legal reasoning of
the Court. The latter question is far more interesting.76 Moreover,
positive law arguably requires distinctions among Justices who do not
concur in the same opinion.77 The Harvard Law Review's annual sur-
vey of the Supreme Court reflects this understanding by declining to
74. Wilkins et al., supra note 28, at 39; cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803).
75. 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see FANK & SHAxLEY, supra note 67, at 9 n.* (describing Bakke
as "the most publicized case of the term").
76. For proof, one need look no further than the cornucopia of scholarship on the relative
virtues of "issue voting" and "outcome voting" - that is, voting issue-by-issue versus voting to
affirm or to reverse. Compare, eg., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and
the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL L. REv. 1 (1993) (advocating issue voting)
and David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multi-
judge Panels, 80 GEo. LJ. 743 (1992) (same) with John M. Rogers, "I Vote This Way Because I'm
Wrong": The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. LJ. 439 (1990-91) (casting doubt on
claims made by the supporters of issue voting) and John M. Rogers, "Issue Voting" by Multi-
member Appellate Courts - A Response to Some Radical Proposals, 49 VAND. L. REv. 997
(1996) (same) and Maxwell L. Steams, How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identifi-
cation: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1045 (1996) (same).
77. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court de-
cides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgments on the narrowest grounds ... ' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,169 n.15
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.))); cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
136 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In a case that has yielded so many opinions as has this one,
it is fruitful to begin by emphasizing the common ground shared by a majority of this Court.").
But of. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1927 (1994) (noting that the "degree of confu-
sion following a splintered [Supreme Court] decision ... is itself a reason for reexamining that
decision").
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"treat two Justices as having agreed if they did not join the same opin-
ion, even if they agreed in the result of the case and wrote separate
opinions revealing very little philosophical disagreement. s78 The
Frank-Shapley index simply fails to account for the increasing preva-
lence and legal significance of plurality opinions, opinions concurring
solely in the judgment, and dissenting opinions.79
For these reasons, we regard the Frank-Shapley index as an un-
satisfactory solution to the conundrum of Supreme Court voting
power. We now present our alternative, based on a modification of
the more naive index we presented in Part II of this Article.
B. A Di -E1Trc COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY APPROACH
We begin where the Frank-Shapley power index fails: We will
eschew the irreducibly subjective project of assessing the Justices' ide-
ological proclivities or the ideological implications of case outcomes.
(To name but three especially vexing examples, we defy anyone to
distinguish the "liberal" from the "conservative" positions on the
constitutionality of punitive damages,80 the retroactivity of court judg-
ments,81 and the dormant commerce clause.82) To be sure, ideological
incompatibility is probably the factor that keeps certain coalitions of
Justices from forming. Rather than attempting the hopeless task of
identifying the amorphous ideological fissures that divide the Justices,
however, we will rely on the record of interaction among the Justices.
78. 1994 Harvard Survey, supra note 27, at 342 n.f.; 1995 Harvard Survey, supra note 27, at
369 n.f.
79. See generally sources cited supra note 62. One final source of weakness lies in the
Frank-Shapley index's definition of a pivotal vote. Frank and Shapley restrict themselves to
pivots arising from linear functionals. Using the same coordinatization of Justices in three-di-
mensional space, one can derive a voting index that uses a different geometric description of the
pivotal vote. The resulting index gives values very similar to those generated by the method
described in the next section of this Article.
80. See, eg., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1
(1991); Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
81. See, eg., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994); Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation,
509 U.S. 86 (1993); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); American
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
82. See, eg., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,
511 U.S. 383 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
504 U.S. 353 (1992).
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The model we develop here is a generalized version of an index
developed by John H. Banzhaf III to analyze weighted voting sys-
tems.83 Banzhaf's application of his own index to multimember elec-
toral districts has haunted the Supreme Court's voting rights cases for
three decades.8 Like the Shapley-Shubik index, the Banzhaf index
"hypothesizes that the true test of voting power is the ability to cast a
tie-breaking, or 'critical' vote."' s In a spirit of cross-disciplinary coop-
eration between law and mathematics,86 we will adopt the Supreme
Court's own explanation of the Banzhaf index:
In a population of n voters, where each voter has a choice between
two alternatives (candidates), there are 2n possible voting combina-
tions. For example, with a population of three voters, A, B, and C,
and two candidates, X and Y, there are eight combinations:
A B C
#1. X X X
#2. X X Y
#3. X Y X
#4. X Y Y
#5. Y X X
#6. Y X Y
#7. Y Y X
#8. Y Y Y
.... In th[is] population of three voters .... any voter can cast a
critical vote in four situations; in the other four situations, the vote
is not critical since it cannot change the outcome of the election.
For example, C can cast a tie-breaking vote only in situations 3, 4, 5,
and 6. The number of combinations in which a voter can cast a tie-
breaking vote is
83. See John F. Banzhaf III, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work- A Mathematical Analysis, 19
RuTrTEps L. REv. 317 (1965).
84. See John F. Banzhaf III, Multi-Member Electoral Districts- Do They Violate the "One
Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE LJ. 1309 (1966), cited in Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581,2608
n.23 (1994) (Thomas, ., concurring in the judgment); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 145-46
n.23 (1971); id. at 168-70 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 125 n.3
(1967) (per curiam); see also Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 697-99 (1989) (rejecting
the "Banzhaf Index" as applied to a borough-by-borough voting scheme within New York City's
municipal government); id. at 704 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) ("I... suspect the Court is correct in rejecting the Banzhaf index .....
85. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 145 n.23 (quoting Banzhaf, supra note 84).
86. One of us is a mathematics professor, the other, a former literature and linguistics ma-
jor who truncated his formal mathematics training at differential equations and managed to
serve a nine-year sentence in postsecondary education without taking statistics, econometrics, or
any other form of applied mathematics. Some accommodation had to be made.
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2. (n-i)!
n-1 n-1
2 2
where n is the number of voters. Dividing this result (critical votes)
by 21 (possible combinations), one arrives at that fraction of possi-
ble combinations in which a voter can cast a critical vote. This is the
[Banzhaf] theory's measure of voting power.87
The generalized Banzhaf index that we use here is merely an ex-
panded version of the index we developed in Part II. The actual vot-
ing record in any given Supreme Court Term allows us to define the
larger (and more analytically useful) set of all feasible coalitions. We
define a feasible coalition as a coalition of only those Justices who
agree to a particular legal proposition. In other words, the members
of any feasible coalition will agree to the legal proposition that defines
the coalition, to the complete exclusion of the other Justices. In mathe-
matical terms, the set of feasible coalitions can be expressed as the
intersection of any collection of actual coalitions, that is, subsets of
Justices (of any size) who concurred in an opinion (majority or other-
wise) during a Term.8  For the nonmathematician, this instruction
simply means that one should look for the Justices common to all of
the coalitions.
For example, during October Term 1994, there were three opin-
ions joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer89 and two other opinions joined by Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.90 The intersection of these
two coalitions is the set of Justices who joined all five of these opin-
ions, that is, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. These
four, standing alone, form a feasible coalition. Based on their behav-
ior in these cases, we may infer that there is some legal proposition on
which these four Justices and only these four would agree.
87. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 145 n.23 (quoting Banzhaf, supra note 84).
88. To see that this mathematical definition is the same as the intuitive one, identify each
coalition with the set of propositions with which its members agree but those outside the coali-
tion disagree. Then the Justices who agree with the union of the set of propositions will be those
in the intersection of the coalitions.
89. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (Stevens, J.); United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (Stevens, J.); Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.).
90. Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995) (Souter, J.); Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851
(1995) (Stevens, J.).
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If all coalitions of Justices were feasible, there would be 512 such
coalitions. (Since there are nine Justices, the total number of different
coalitions of Justices is 29, or 512. Note that we adopt the mathemati-
cally convenient, albeit legally nonsensical, convention that the empty
coalition is possible.) During the 1994 Term, we found exactly 308 of
the possible collections to be feasible.91 Only 228 coalitions out of 512
were feasible during the 1995 Term. Taking the two Terms together,
we discovered 398 feasible coalitions. The set of feasible coalitions is
therefore far more limited than the set of all coalitions. By the same
token, the number of feasible coalitions is greater than the number of
actual coalitions. During the 1994 Term, only 74 actual coalitions of
Justices emerged, ranging from single dissents to the grand coalition of
all Justices in a unanimous Court. Exactly the same number of actual
coalitions appeared during the 1995 Term, and the two Terms together
witnessed a total of 108 actual coalitions.
We can now apply the voting index that we developed in Part II
of this Article to the set of feasible coalitions. For each Justice, we
count the number of times that (1) the Justice appears in a five-Justice
feasible coalition, and (2) the coalition obtained by removing that Jus-
tice is a feasible coalition as well. The first inquiry determines the
maximum number of times that the Justice in question might have cast
the pivotal vote in a five-Justice feasible coalition. The second inquiry
is designed to eliminate situations in which this Justice could not have
cast the pivotal vote. If the four Justices left by our hypothetical Jus-
tice's defection do not themselves form a feasible coalition, this is a
reliable signal that the would-be defector is too ideologically bound to
the other four. A threat by this Justice to defect would not be credible
because she has not demonstrated sufficient ideological independence
to abandon the rest of the coalition. We then normalize these num-
bers so that each Justice is accorded a percentage weight. So adjusted,
these weights add up to 100 percent.
In Tables 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3 below, we summarize the results of
this calculation:
91. See infra p.103-111 (app.).
1996]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
TABLE 3.2.1: ANOTHER LOOK AT SUPREME COURT
POWER, 1994 TERM
Justice Power Index Power Quotient
Rehnquist 10.2 92
Stevens 9.4 85
O'Connor 8.3 75
Scalia 12.4 112
Kennedy 14.3 129
Souter 10.9 98
Thomas 8.6 77
Ginsburg 13.2 119
Breyer 12.8 115
TABLE 3.2.2: ANOTHER LOOK AT SUPREME COURT
POWER, 1995 TERM
Justice Power Index Power Quotient
Rehnquist 12.0 108
Stevens 7.4 67
O'Connor 13.1 118
Scalia 11.4 103
Kennedy 12.6 114
Souter 9.7 87
Thomas 10.9 98
Ginsburg 14.9 134
Breyer 8.0 72
TABLE 3.2.3: SUPREME COURT POWER, 1994 AND
1995 TERMS
Justice Power Index Power Quotient
Rehnquist 11.5 104
Stevens 9.4 85
O'Connor 10.1 91
Scalia 10.1 91
Kennedy 12.7 114
Souter 11.7 106
Thomas 10.6 95
Ginsburg 12.9 116
Breyer 11.0 99
The computation underlying this modified index is exactly the same as
the one we described in Part II of this Article. The difference is that
[Vol. 70:63
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the larger set of feasible five- and four-Justice coalitions, as interpo-
lated from the more limited set of actual coalitions, gives us a larger
sample size and helps us circumvent the problem of small numbers.
As applied to the 1977 Term, our modified index generates power rat-
ings ranging between 10.0 and 12.0,91 a far narrower spread than the
huge variations generated by the Frank-Shapley index.
C. A TOUR OF THE INDEXES
The differences between our naive analysis of five-Justice majori-
ties and our more sophisticated analysis of all feasible coalitions de-
serve especially close attention. Moving from the naive index to a
generalized Banzhaf index changes the power ratings in two signifi-
cant ways. First, the larger data set underlying the generalized
Banzhaf index systematically favors Justices who, on balance, vote
more often than their colleagues with the Court majority. Because
the set of feasible coalitions is derived from the intersection of all ac-
tual coalitions that develop over the course of a Term, Justices who
appear disproportionately in majority coalitions are likely to appear in
a greater number of feasible five-Justice coalitions. By definition, dis-
senting or concurring solely in the judgment evinces a failure either to
build or to join a winning coalition.
A second, albeit closely related, phenomenon may explain the
differences between the naive and the sophisticated power ratings.
Certain Justices may find a relatively greater number of opportunities
to defect from otherwise winning coalitions. Such a Justice may be
said to be more ideologically supple than his colleagues. In other
words, he makes more distinctions among legal propositions and thus
can dissociate and realign himself with a greater range of stable coali-
tions. The Court's likeliest tiebreakers are therefore those Justices
who, first, are close enough to the ideological center of gravity on a
variety of legal issues to find themselves in a greater number of major-
ity coalitions and, second, are sufficiently flexible to abandon a broad
range of coalitions.
Our ratings of Justices Stevens and Kennedy for the 1994 Term
illustrate these effects. In our naive index for the 1994 Term, both
Justices held a disproportionately greater share of the Court's total
voting power. Justice Kennedy's edge over Justice Stevens was a rela-
tively narrow 3.7 percentage points, 16.4 to 12.7. According to the
92. See supra note 73.
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generalized Banzhaf index, however, Justice Stevens held a dispropor-
tionately low share of the Court's power for that Term; he held a
power quotient of merely 85. In addition, Justice Kennedy's edge
over Justice Stevens ballooned to nearly five percentage points
(14.3% versus 9.4%). Justice Kennedy's superior performance in the
sophisticated index for the 1994 Term can be attributed to his remark-
able record of voting with the majority. In that Term's eighty-six fully
reasoned decisions, Justice Kennedy dissented only six times.93 By
contrast, Justice Stevens dissented twenty-six times, four times more
often than Justice Kennedy.94 A Justice who dissents in more than a
quarter of a Term's cases is either too quirky or too far from the
Court's ideological center of gravity to cast a large number of pivotal
votes.
We believe that the more sophisticated index outperforms the na-
Yve index in measuring the Court's true "coalitional deep structure."
The relatively limited number of actual five-Justice coalitions in any
Term understates the full range of coalition-building possibilities
within the Court. By contrast, the extrapolation underlying the so-
phisticated index's data set helps identify which of the Justices who
appear most often in winning coalitions are the truly pivotal voters.
IV. THE POWER PAGEANT OF THE JUSTICES
A. THERiE HE Is: THE MOST DANGEROUS JUSTICE
We are now prepared to nominate the finalists for the title of
Most Dangerous Justice. We begin with October Term 1994. Four
Justices-Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer-carried more than
their pro rata share of the Court's collective power. With ratings clus-
tered between 12.4 and 14.3, however, we hesitate to name that
Term's Most Dangerous Justice without taking the analysis somewhat
beyond the numbers. In Supreme Court surveys as in university ad-
missions, the indeterminacy of raw test scores justifies a consideration
of certain "plus factors." 95
First, we may count the number of cases decided by particular
coalitions. The more cases that a working majority of five Justices
decides, the more likely that this very coalition will be perceived as a
93. See 1994 Harvard Survey, supra note 27, at 340.
94. See id.
95. Cf Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-18 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 passim (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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dominant force within a particular Court. Previously we declined to
consider this factor as a component of our generalized Banzhaf index.
Our index, after all, seeks to determine the Court's "coalitional deep
structure"-that is, the full range of feasible coalitions among each
particular group of nine Justices-not the relative stability or political
significance of particular coalitions. We are using a "limited set of
decided cases" to identify the current Justices' competence, or organic
capacity, to form coalitions, without regard to the concrete political
consequences of such coalition-building during any given Term.96 Fac-
tors measuring actual political performance, however, rank high in any
pragmatic assessment of the Court.
In the 1994 Term, the "conservative" coalition of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Associate Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas rendered no fewer than six 5-4 decisions,97 including high-
profile, controversial decisions on religious liberty, congressional re-
districting, prisoners' rights, affirmative action, school desegregation,
and federalism. Two different "liberal" coalitions-both comprising
the four Justices excluded from the "conservative" bloc, plus either
Justice O'Connor or Justice Kennedy-delivered a total of five deci-
sions.98 All but one of the other five-Justice coalitions rendered a sin-
gle decision.
By this measure, Justice Kennedy trounced the other finalists for
the title of Most Dangerous Justice. During the 1994 Term, he partici-
pated in seventeen five-Justice majorities. Justice Ginsburg joined
five-Justice coalitions in thirteen separate cases, while Justices Scalia
and Breyer each took part in nine such coalitions.
96. Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1306
(1995); cf. Nohm CHOMsKY, AsPECrS oF THE THmoRY OF SYNTAX 4 (1965) (using a limited
number of instances of linguistic performance, "the actual use of language in concrete situa-
tions," to derive "the underlying system of [grammatical] rules" that defines linguistic
competence).
97. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (Kennedy,
J.); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (Kennedy, J.); Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293
(1995) (Rehnquist, CJ.); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (O'Connor,
J.); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) (Rehnquist, Ci.); United States v. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. 1624 (1995) (Rehnquist, Ci.).
98. The coalition of Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer decided
Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995) (Souter, J.); and Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995)
(Stevens, 3.). The coalition of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer decided
U.S. Term Limits, Inc v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (Stevens, J.); United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (Stevens, J.); and Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.).
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The putative "importance" of cases decided by particular five-
Justice coalitions is another, though less reliable, measure of the polit-
ically adjusted voting of individual Justices. The Harvard Law Re-
view's annual survey of Supreme Court decisions provides an informal
and unavoidably subjective list of each Term's "greatest hits." Of the
twenty-four cases identified in the Review's study of the 1994 Term,99
thirteen were decided by a one-vote margin. This fifty-four percent
ratio vastly exceeded the twenty-two percent ratio of such cases within
the Court's entire docket. All six of the decisions rendered by the
conservative Rehnquist-O'Connor-Scalia-Kennedy-Thomas bloc mer-
ited mention in the Harvard survey.'00 Of the seven other single-vote
decisions covered in the Harvard survey, Justice Kennedy voted with
the majority five times. In these decisions, Justice Scalia sided with
the majority twice. Notably, Justice Kennedy abandoned the con-
servative bloc in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,10 1 rated by
Harvard as the Term's most significant decision."° Overall, Justice
Kennedy voted with the majority in eleven of the thirteen most impor-
tant single-vote opinions of the 1994 Term. By comparison, Justice
Ginsburg voted with the majority in six such cases; Justice Breyer, in
seven. Once again, the edge goes to Anthony Kennedy.
The number of 5-4 decisions written by each Justice constitutes an
additional plus factor. The power to assign is the power to destroy: 103
Court observers have long recognized that "the power to select the
author" of an opinion equals "the power to determine the general di-
rection of the opinion."' t That power becomes all the more signifi-
cant when "the reasoning" of an opinion is "as important as [its]
finding" of law.'0 5 The four finalists for the title of the 1994 Term's
Most Dangerous Justice are all too junior to manipulate this power by
assigning majority opinions to themselves. Collectively they hold
2.7% of the Court's theoretical assigning power and an even slimmer
share of the actual power to assign.' 6 Justice Kennedy has enough
99. See The Supreme Court, 1994 Term, 109 HAgv. L. REv. 10, 12 (1995).
100. See cases cited supra note 97.
101. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
102. See Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term: Comment - Dueling Sovereign-
ties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HAgv. L. REv. 78 (1995). By tradition, a profes-
sional author writes the case comment on the Term's most significant decision or group of
decisions for Harvard's annual survey.
103. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) ("[T]he power to tax
involves the power to destroy ....").
104. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 65.
105. See id.
106. See infra Part V.B, especially Table 5.1.
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seniority to assign himself a majority opinion only in the singular in-
stance of a five-Justice coalition consisting of the five most junior Jus-
tices. More likely, when one of these junior Justices receives an
assignment to write a majority opinion, he or she stands near or at the
ideological frontiers of that coalition.0 7
We are mindful of limitations on the usefulness of this factor.
Chief Justices over time have "dramatically over-assign[ed] to those
ideologically closest to them and under-assigned to those furthest
from them."10 Justice Kennedy's disproportionate share of majority
assignments may be explained in part by his record of aligning himself
with Chief Justice Rehnquist in 83.7% of their common votes during
the 1994 Term-a far higher record than that of any other Associate
Justice.10 9 Moreover, the Court's institutional "tendency to give fewer
assignments to newcomers" partly explains the lower number of opin-
ion assignments received by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer." 0 We will
nevertheless treat the number of opinions written for five-Justice ma-
jorities as a modest but meaningful measure of a Justice's voting
power.
During the 1994 Term, Justice Kennedy wrote five opinions for
five-Justice majorities, including three in the Harvard Law Review's
hit parade. These five opinions comprised a full half of his ten princi-
pal opinions during that Term."' Justice Ginsburg wrote four opin-
ions for five-Justice majorities, none among Harvard's list of
heavyweights. Those four, however, tied Justice Ginsburg with Justice
Stevens in second place behind Justice Kennedy. The Chief Justice
assigned himself three 5-4 majority opinions during the 1994 Term." 2
No other Justice wrote more than two opinions in this category. Our
third and fourth finalists fared quite poorly in this test of power. In
his first year on the Court, Justice Breyer wrote no opinion in which
he might have cast the pivotal vote. Neither did the veteran Antonin
Scalia. Edge to Kennedy.
107. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAEm, THE SuPRmE COURT AND THE ATrTu-
DINAL MODEL 274 (1993) (citing DONALD W. RHODE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SuPREME COURT
DECISION MAKING ch. 8 (1978) (noting that the marginal Justice in a majority coalition gets a
disproportionately large share of opinion assignments)).
108. Id. at 268.
109. See infra Table 4.1.
110. SEGAL & SPAm, supra note 107, at 269-70.
111. See 1994 Harvard Survey, supra note 27, at 340, 343.
112. See id. at 343.
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Finally, the Harvard survey provides a way to measure each Jus-
tice's "ideological flexibility" independently of the Court's deep coali-
tional structure. As we mentioned in our discussion of the differences
between our naive and sophisticated indexes, more "ideologically sup-
ple" Justices tend to cast pivotal votes because they are more willing
to leave coalitions. Harvard's annual tally of the Justices' voting align-
ments thus reinforces what our index aims to measure: each Justice's
ability to form winning coalitions and thereby to cast decisive, law-
making votes.
TABLE 4.1: VOTING ALIGNMENTS, 1994 TERM113
CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS Cr RBG SGB
C *** 50.6 76.7 80.0 83.7 68.6 81.4 67.1 67.1
JPS 50.6 *** 55.3 45.2 61.2 69.4 42.4 75.0 70.7
Soc 76.7 55.3 *** 68.2 75.6 76.7 67.4 64.7 74.4
AS 80.0 45.2 68.2 *** 75.3 60.0 88.2 59.5 59.3
AMK 83.7 61.2 75.6 75.3 ** 73.3 73.3 76.5 72.0
DHS 68.6 69.4 76.7 60.0 73.3 *** 55.8 80.0 82.9
CT 81.4 42.4 67.4 88.2 73.3 55.8 *** 54.1 58.5
RBG 67.1 75.0 64.7 59.5 76.5 80.0 54.1 *** 82.7
SGB 67.1 70.7 74.4 59.3 72.0 82.9 58.5 82.7 **
Avg 71.9 58.7 69.9 67.0 73.9 70.8 65.1 70.0 71.0
StD 10.2 11.5 7.0 12.9 5.8 8.8 14.3 9.5 8.7
In Table 4.1, the average of the percentage of "the number of
times that one Justice voted with another in full-opinion decisions"
measures that Justice's proximity to the Court's ideological center of
gravity.114 A Justice such as Justice Stevens, whose political prefer-
ences probably fall well to the left of those of the Court as a whole,
will register a lower average (58.7) than will a "median" or "pivotal"
Justice. The standard deviation of these percentages measures each
Justice's flexibility. The higher the standard deviation, the more vio-
lent the disparity in an individual Justice's voting alignments with his
or her colleagues. For example, Justice Thomas' standard deviation of
14.3, by far the highest on the Court, is in no small part due to his very
high rate of alignment with Justice Scalia (88.2%) and his very low
rate of alignment with Justice Stevens (42.4%).
During October Term 1994, Justice Kennedy led the Court in
both measures of compatibility. He outranked even the Chief Justice
in average collegiality, and the remarkably low standard deviation
(5.8) of his alignment rates suggests that he may have been the Court's
113. This table is derived from 1994 Harvard Survey, supra note 27, at 341.
114. Id.
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most ideologically supple Justice. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer fared
reasonably well on both measures, but their performances were on par
with those by the Chief Justice and by Justices O'Connor and Souter.
Not surprisingly, the lowest average rates of alignment and highest
standard deviations belonged to the Justices most often believed to
define the Court's ideological frontiers: Justices Stevens, Scalia, and
Thomas.
One Justice thus has compiled the highest numerical score and
completed a clean sweep of all subjective plus factors in our survey of
Supreme Court voting power. We believe we have a winner. The en-
velope please ....
The Most Dangerous Justice during October Term 1994 was
Anthony M. Kennedy. Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer
followed closely on Justice Kennedy's heels. It is not altogether inap-
propriate to dub them, respectively, the First Runner-Up and Mr.
Congeniality. Whether or not Justice Kennedy "knows if [he's] Cae-
sar about to cross the Rubicon, or Captain Queeg cutting [his] own
tow line,""'  he casts the heaviest harpoon-er, vote-among the
Justices.
B. I AM WoMAN; HI"IAR M RoAR 16
If 1992 was electoral politics' "year of the woman," October Term
1995 was the Supreme Court's rejoinder. In a Term distinguished by
the possible emergence of a new constitutional standard of review in
gender discrimination cases," 7 the Court's female Justices dominated
our voting power ratings. Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor led the
way with 14.9% and 13.1% of the Court's total voting power. Justice
Kennedy snuck into the finals with a 12.6 rating, off his torrid 1994
pace but still formidable. At 12.0, Chief Justice Rehnquist made a
weak fourth finalist.
Justice O'Connor underwent a remarkable resurrection in the
1995 Term. Her share of the Court's collective voting power rose
115. Terry Carter, Crossing the Rubicon, CAL. LAw., Oct. 1992, at 39, 39-40 (quoting Ken-
nedy on June 29, 1992, the day the Court decided Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
116. HELEN REDDY, I Am Woman, on HELEN REDDY'S GREATEST Hrrs (Capital Records,
Inc. 1975) (singing of "[n]umbers too big to ignore").
117. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264,2274-76 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.) (describing
the "'exceedingly persuasive justification"' needed to overcome the Court's "skeptical scrutiny
of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex").
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nearly five percentage points, lifting her from dead last in the genera-
lized Banzhaf index for the 1994 Term to a strong second in the 1995
ratings. One possible, albeit unavoidably subjective, explanation lies
in the difference between the dockets in these two Terms. The 1994
Term gave the Court's right wing significant 5-4 victories in "affirma-
tive action, school desegregation, voting rights, religious speech and
... federalism."'118 By contrast, October Term 1995 "was a term with
not one theme, but many."1"9 The 1995 Term produced an unusually
high number of cases in which the Justices could not agree on a coher-
ent legal rationale. Three cases were decided in whole or in part by a
vote of 3-2-4,110 and two cases exhibited 4-1-4 splits.' 2 ' The Court's
division in Colorado Republican Campaign Committee v. FEC almost
defies description; it can most charitably be characterized as a 3-3-1-2
split.122 Nor was the Court's collective inflexibility limited to isolated
episodes. Although the 1995 Term yielded as many fully reasoned
opinions as did the 1994 Term (eighty-six in all), the number of feasi-
ble coalitions declined from 308 to 228. On such a divided Court, one
might expect an "accommodationist" such as Justice O'Connor to
118. Marcia Coyle, Term Reveals Pragmatic Supreme Court, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at C2.
119. Linda Greenhouse, In Supreme Court's Decisions, A Clear Voice, and a Murmur, N.Y.
TwMEs, July 3, 1996, at Al.
120. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941,1950 (1996) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, CJ., and Kennedy, J.); id. at 1968 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1971 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring); id. at 1972 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Scalia, J.); id.
at 1974 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.); id. at 1997 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.); Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (1996)
(plurality opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 1213 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment, joined by O'Connor & Souter, JJ.); id. at 1222 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, CJ., and Scalia, J., and in part by Kennedy, J.); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecom.
muns. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2394-97 (1996) (plurality opinion of Breyer, J.,
joined by Stevens & Souter, JJ.) (striking down § 10(c) of the Cable Television Consumer Pro-
tection and Competition Act of 1992); id at 2417-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (striking down § 10(c) on
a different rationale).
121. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2251-53 (1996) (plurality opinion of Ste-
vens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.); id. at 2259-62 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment in relevant part); id. at 2262-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in relevant part, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Thomas, JJ.); Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2016 (1996)
(plurality opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.); id. at
2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by
Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ.).
122. See Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309,2312 (1996) (opin-
ion of Breyer, J., joined by O'Connor & Souter, JJ.); id. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.); id. at 2323 (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, joined in parts I and II by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Scalia, J.); id. at 2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
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flourish. At the very least, constrained as the range of coalition-form-
ing opportunities was, October Term 1995 might not have provided
the most ideologically supple Justices a full and fair opportunity to
forge alliances.
The first plus factor that we analyzed for the 1994 Term, the
number of cases decided by particular coalitions, strongly disfavored
Justice Ginsburg vis-4-vis the other power pageant finalists for the
1995 Term. The conservative juggernaut consisting of the Chief Jus-
tice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas assembled
seven 5-4 decisions in the 1995 Term. Only one other five-Justice coa-
lition-that consisting of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer-mustered more than a single decision. Justice Ginsburg
joined the winning side in six 5-4 decisions, compared to nine for the
Chief Justice and twelve apiece for Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.
Edge to the moderate Reagan appointees.
Our second "plus" factor, the number of important cases com-
manded by particular five-Justice coalitions, is even murkier. Of the
twenty-five cases deemed by the Harvard Law Review to be the most
significant of the 1995 Term,123 five were decided by a 5-4 margin. 24
Each of these decisions was rendered by a different five-Justice coali-
tion. Another "big case" named by the Harvard Law Review is note-
worthy because the three-Justice plurality that announced the
judgment in that case consisted of the Chief Justice and Justices
O'Connor andKennedy-three of the four finalists in the 1995 term's
power pageant.125 In yet another leading case, Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg formed a bloc of two in a 3-2-4 split. 126 In all, Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined winning five-Justice majorities in two important de-
cisions, while Justices O'Connor and Kennedy each appeared in four
such majorities. Justice Ginsburg boasted three appearances. Advan-
tage, Kennedy, but only by a hair.
Every once in a while, rank does have its privileges. The Chief
Justice dominates the third "plus" factor in this power pageant: the
number of 5-4 decisions written by each finalist. In October Term
123. See The Supreme Court, 1995 Term, 110 HAgv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1996).
124. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
125. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
126. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2404 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
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1995, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote four opinions for five-Justice ma-
jorities, including powerhouse opinions on the Eleventh Amend-
ment' 27  and race-conscious legislative redistricting." Justice
O'Connor wrote but one; 29 her power sister, Justice Ginsburg, wrote
two.' 30 Justice Kennedy, the fiagbearer for the conservative coalition
during the 1994 Term, wrote no 5-4 opinions in the 1995 Term. Sur-
prisingly, four of the eight decisions rendered by the conservative
Rehnquist-O'Connor-Scalia-Kennedy-Thomas coalition took the form
of per curiam opinions. Thrice in the 1995 Term this coalition summa-
rily dispensed with death penalty petitions,' 3' and thrice the Justices
on the other side of the Court's ideological divide objected to the
summary disposition of these cases. In this display of voting power,
then, Chief Justice Rehnquist outshone his fellow finalists, with honor-
able mention to Per Curiam, J.
TABLE 4.2: VOTING ALIGNMENTS, 1995 TERM132
CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RGB SGB
CI P *** 49.4 79.7 82.3 78.5 67.1 82.1 65.8 58.2
JPS P 49.4 *** 59.7 45.5 64.9 70.1 44.7 72.7 72.7
SOC P 79.7 59.7 *** 72.2 78.5 78.5 71.8 68.4 74.7
AS P 82.3 45.5 72.2 *** 73.4 60.8 87.2 58.2 54.4
AMK P 78.5 64.9 78.5 73.4 *** 74.7 69.2 75.9 68.4
DHS P 67.1 70.1 78.5 60.8 74.7 *** 57.7 83.5 87.3
CT P 82.1 44.7 71.8 87.2 69.2 57.7 *** 55.1 48.7
RGB P 65.8 72.7 68.4 58.2 75.9 83.5 55.1 *** 74.7
SGB P 58.2 72.7 74.7 54.4 68.4 87.3 48.7 74.7 ***
Avg 70A 60.0 72.9 66.8 72.9 72.5 64.6 69.3 67.4
SED 11.5 11.2 6.2 13.4 4.7 9.8 14.5 8.8 11.9
127. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). The Harvard Law Review rated
this decision as the 1995 Term's most significant. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, 1995 Term-CommenL" The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARv. L. REV. 102
(1996); cf. supra note 99.
128. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
129. See Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996).
130. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 224 (1996); Holly Farms Corp.
v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1396 (1996).
131. See Bowersox v. Williams, 116 S. Ct. 1312 (1996) (per curiam) (vacating a stay of execu-
tion); Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S. Ct. 7 (1995) (per curiam) (summarily vacating a state
supreme court's reversal of a capital sentence); Netherland v. Tuggle, 116 S. Ct. 4 (1995) (per
curiam) (vacating a stay of execution). The fourth summary disposition rendered by this coali-
tion during the 1995 Term, Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S. Ct. 2068 (1996) (per curiam), reversed as
"plainly wrong" a federal "court of appeals' state-law ruling" on the severability of a partially
unconstitutional state statute, id. at 2073.
132. This table is derived from 1995 Harvard Survey, supra note 27, at 368.
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Our final informal measure of power, the Justices' aggregate rates
of alignment with each other, falls far short of delivering a decisive
answer. The four power pageant finalists for the 1995 Term were simi-
lar in their degree of collegiality, ranking first, second, fourth, and
fifth on the Court overall. (Justice Souter finished third.)
The most notable development on alignment rates in the 1995
Term actually involved nonfinalist Justice Breyer. Between the 1994
and 1995 Terms, Justice Breyer's alignment rates dropped from those
of a collegial power player to those of an ideological outsider. The
standard deviation of his alignment rates in the 1995 Term exceeded
Justice Steven's standard deviation, which in the 1994 Term had
marked one of that Court's ideological outposts. Not surprisingly,
Justice Breyer during the same period fell from being Mr. Congenial-
ity to not even qualifying for the power pageant of the Justices. In-
deed, his loss of 4.8 points in his power index between the two Terms
was our survey's most dramatic decline in power.
Among our finalists, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy tied for the
highest average rate of alignment, but Justice Kennedy reduced the
standard deviation of his alignment rates to an astonishing 4.7. (In
other words, Justice Kennedy agreed with each of his colleagues al-
most three-quarters of the time-not much more, not much less.) The
Reagan moderates again win a category, although Justice Kennedy
probably merits a small nod over Justice O'Connor.
A muddled Term deserves a muddled round of playoffs in the
power pageant of the Justices. None of the 1995 Term's finalists
emerged a clear winner on the informal measures of voting power.
Then again, we can hardly expect a clarion call during a Term that
gave us catastrophically confused free speech decisions on commercial
speech,133 campaign finance,"3 and indecent cablecasting. 135 Let con-
fusion reign as it will; numbers have their value. This year's power
ratings will stand unadjusted.
Drum roll, please. We are ready to crown the Most Dangerous
Justice of October Term 1995. There she is... Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Sandra Day O'Connor captures the title of First Runner-Up.
Anthony Kennedy, alas, must console himself with the title of Mr.
Congeniality.
133. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
134. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
135. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium,clnc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
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V. POSTSCRIPT: THE POWER AND THE GLORY?
A. BLESSED ARE T=E SUPPLE IN SPiI...
Anthony Kennedy convincingly won the title of Most Dangerous
Justice during October Term 1994. With comparable force, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg swept the 1995 Term's power pageant. These two
were the only Justices to wield more than their pro rata share of the
Supreme Court's voting power in both the 1994 Term and the 1995
Term. Not surprisingly, Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg led our two-
year composite power ratings by a substantial margin. 136 Other power
pageant finalists, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Breyer, flashed and faded like comets, like
long-haired galactic visitors whose moment on the celestial stage re-
treats as quickly as it comes. 137 By contrast, power that persists "may
be compared with the pole-star," the Confucian and constitutional
emblem of "government by means of virtue.1138 If there is any fixed
star in the constellation of Supreme Court voting, it is that no Justice,
high or petty, should be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of legal opinion.1 39
"This is what this [Article] is about. Power.' 40 Our variant of
the generalized Banzhaf index measures the propensity of each Justice
to vote at the margins of a winning coalition. The most dangerous
Justices are those who are most able-and willing-to switch their
votes on incremental but decisive legal propositions. What we seek to
measure, then, is the marginal propensity to cast the critical vote in
contestable and contested disputes over legal reasoning in Supreme
Court decisions. The power at the margin is the power to decide.
"Natura non facit saltum," intoned Alfred Marshall at the dawn of
20th century economics.141 So too does law exhibit the marginalist
instinct: Like nature, law makes no sudden leaps.
136. Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg compiled two-year power ratings of 12.7 and 12.9 re-
spectively, with Justice Souter trailing badly in third at 11.7. See supra Table 3.2.3.
137. Cf. WiLLAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5, 11. 25-27 (Eugene M. Waith ed.
1954) ("Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player / That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
I And then is heard no more.").
138. CoNFrucrs, Tim ANALECTS § 2.1, at 6 (Raymond Dawson trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1993).
139. Cf. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
140. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This case is about power .... ).
141. 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCipLES OF ECONONUCS xiii (9th ed. 1961) (1890); see also
LiNNAEus, PHMLOSOPmA BoTANIcAl§ 77 (1750).
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The marginalist emphasis should make it clear that we are not
looking for the "median" Justice. Supreme Court controversies, espe-
cially when considered as an organic whole rather than individually,
do not readily lend themselves to the preferential orderings that lie at
the heart of the Shapley-Shubik index. Indeed, Frank Easterbrook
has shown that the presence of stare decisis concerns makes it impos-
sible to describe Supreme Court voting behavior in terms of single-
peaked preferences. 42 Maxwell Stearns has brought a similar degree
of public choice sophistication to the question of standing. 43 The
question of voting power at the margins of complex, multifaceted legal
issues is independent of any particular Justice's ideology. We are not
asking whether a Justice stands in the Court's ideological mainstream
or along the fringes. Rather, we are measuring how smoothly a Jus-
tice, regardless of her jurisprudential preferences, forms winning co-
alitions with her colleagues.
As a practical matter, voting power will fluctuate from Term to
Term. Certain salient issues impart a distinct flavor to the Court's
docket each Term. 144 There were Terms during the 1980s when tak-
ings and civil rights were all the rage. One might describe free speech
as the dominant theme of the 1995 Term. If the distribution of issues
before the Court differs from Term to Term, so should individual Jus-
tices' relative shares of voting power. Different Justices will find
themselves in the pivotal position on different issues. Justices Gins-
burg and Breyer, for instance, parted ways on far more questions dur-
ing the 1995 Term than many observers expected, especially on "some
critical questions . . .involving business, criminal justice, and First
Amendment issues.""45 In the short run, then, a Justice's performance
in the Court's power pageant may depend to a substantial extent on
the content of the docket.
Over the long haul, of course, the extraordinary diversity of the
Court's business erodes the docket's effect on the Justices' voting
power. Over the course of several years, a Justice's relative power
within the Court will depend heavily on his ability to bend at the fron-
tiers of his jurisprudential preferences. In rough terms, one might say
142. See Easterbrook, supra note 55, at 811-31.
143. See Steams, supra note 24; Steams, supra note 58.
144. But see Stuart Taylor Jr., Is Judicial Restraint Dead?, LBGAL Tnvms, July 29,1996, at S25
("It is a bit artificial to derive a general idea from the jumble of rulings that happen to issue from
the Supreme Court in any given term.").
145. See Eva M. Rodriguez, Clinton's Justices: Not a Matched Set, LEGAL TnsES, July 15,
1996, at 1.
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that certain Justices are relatively more committed to a particular view
of the law, while others are more open to persuasion. Although two
Terms do not permit us to draw firm conclusions, we suspect that Jus-
tices Kennedy and Ginsburg will continue to cast a greater share of
decisive votes than will Justices Stevens, O'Connor, or Scalia.
B. .. FOR Timms Is THE KINGDOM OF POWER
Whoa. Read that list again. Stevens, yes; Scalia, yes; but
O'Connor? Could Sandra Day O'Connor be one of the Supreme
Court's weaker Justices? Despite her strong performance in October
Term 1995, we have reason to believe that Justice O'Connor is far
from being the Most Dangerous Justice. Our study of Supreme Court
power contradicts one of the most widespread beliefs about the
Court's internal dynamics. Under the more sophisticated generalized
Banzhaf index, Justice O'Connor ranked dead last in the 1994 Term's
power pageant and tied with Justice Scalia for a distant seventh in the
composite ratings. Perhaps Justice O'Connor's relatively poor show-
ing suggests something even deeper about the Court's power struc-
ture. Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg registered power
quotients well above 100 in our two-year composite measure of
power, while Justice Breyer is voting right at par power. That align-
ment of Justices may hold the key to understanding the true meaning
of voting power on the Supreme Court.
With the exceptions of Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice,146
the five most junior Justices cast discernibly heavier votes than their
four senior colleagues. Seniority ordinarily has its privileges. So why
are the senior members of the Supreme Court casting such weak
votes? Perhaps there is a systematic trade-off between voting and
other ways to maximize power within the Supreme Court.
The Justices, after all, do more than vote on cases. They also set
the Court's decisionmaking agenda. 47 The Chief Justice rules the
cert. pool,148 an administrative device that disposes of four-fifths of
the Court's docket in summary fashion.149 More importantly, the
power of assignment follows seniority, trickling down from the Chief
146. Justice Thomas underperforms slightly, and Chief Justice Rehnquist votes somewhat
more heavily than one would expect of the "average" Justice. See supra Table 3.2.3.
147. See generally H.W. PERRY, JR., DEcINr TO DECIDE: AGENDA SM-rmo IN THE
UNrirD STATES SUPREME COURT (1991).
148. See generally i at 41-91.
149. See DAvIm M. O'BrEN, SToma CEwTE: Tim SuPREME COURT iN AMmuCAN Pou.
ncs 184 (1986).
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to the fourth most senior Associate Justice. As we noted above, the
power to assign is the power to set the Court's agenda. And that
power rests almost exclusively in the four most senior members of the
Court.
There are 512 (or 29) possible coalitions among Justices, ranging
from each of the Justices dissenting alone to the unanimous Court.
(We again sacrifice legal coherence for mathematical convenience by
including the empty coalition of zero Justices.) Of these, exactly half,
or 256, are winning coalitions of five or more Justices. If we assume
that all coalitions are feasible, we readily see that opportunities to as-
sign cases rapidly diminish with declining seniority:
TABLE 5.1: THEORETICAL PROBABILITY OF ASSIGNING A
MAJORITY OPINION
Justice 5-4 6-3 7-2 8-1 9-0 Total %
CJ 70 56 28 8 1 163 63.7
JPS 35 21 7 1 0 64 25.0
SOC 15 6 1 0 0 22 8.6
AS 5 1 0 0 0 6 2.3
AMK 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.4
Total 126 84 36 9 1 256 100.0
Together, the Chief Justice and the senior Associate Justice hold
nearly nine-tenths of the Court's theoretical "assigning power."
The significance of opinion assignments cannot be overstated.
Once claimed or transferred, the privilege of "[d]rafting a proposed
majority opinion gives a Justice well-nigh dictatorial control of a
case."' 50 Simply being assigned an opinion is no guarantee that the
author will not switch his or her vote on the merits of a case. 51 Power
150. Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of the Judicial Power, 59 Mo. L. REv. 281, 300
(1994).
151. See SEGAL & SPAm, supra note 107, at 274-75 (noting that the marginal Justice in a
coalition is more likely than any other to receive the opinion assignment, but that the assignment
has no impact on the writing Justice's likelihood of defecting); Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth,
Majority Opinion Assignments and the Maintenance of the Original Coalition on the Warren
Court, 32 AM. J. PoL Scr. 72, 80 (1988) (same). This raises an interesting question: If opinion
assignments cannot deter defection, what explains the practice of assigning an opinion to the
marginal member of a coalition? Either a desire to avoid having to reassign opinions after de-
fection, see Saul Brenner, Reassigning the Majority Opinion on the United States Supreme Court,
11 JusT. Sys. J. 186, 187 (1986), or a desire to create a temperate opinion that reconciles oppos-
ing points of view and is less likely to be overruled by a future Court, see William P.
McLauchlan, Ideology and Conflict in Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 1942-1962, 25 W.
PoL. Q. 16, 26 (1972).
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of this magnitude is surely not dispensed thoughtlessly. The opinion
assignment probably represents the single most significant tool for
agenda control in the Supreme Court.
In practice, the Chief and the senior Associate Justice hold a vir-
tual monopoly on opinion assignments. Coalitions, as we have seen,
are not randomly distributed across a docket. In the 1994 Term, for
instance, 32.6% of the Court's cases were unanimous.152 Chief Jus-
tices from Fred Vinson to William Rehnquist have assigned roughly
eighty to eighty-five percent of the Court's majority opinions. 3 Stra-
tegic behavior, if present, further magnifies the Chief's power. If the
Chief Justice switches his vote after the Conference of the Justices in
order to regain the privilege of assigning the opinion, as Warren Bur-
ger was notorious for doing,154 the sleight of hand intensifies the
Chief's grip on the assignment process.
The structure of the Conference reinforces the Chief Justice and
the senior Associate Justices' power over agenda-setting. "Customa-
rily, the Chief Justice frames the discussion of a case with a review of
its facts and mention of its history and of relevant legal precedent. In
descending order of seniority, the remaining justices present their
views."' 55 By the time the discussion reaches Justices Thomas, Gins-
burg, and Breyer, there is little or no "spin" left to impart.
In short, the more junior Associate Justices have virtually no
hope of manipulating the Court's agenda. Potter Stewart, for in-
stance, served on the Court fourteen years before he "found himself
the senior member of a majority."'1 56 (And then he promptly gave the
case away.) 157 Justice Kennedy, 1994's Most Dangerous Justice, has a
152. See 1994 Harvard Survey, supra note 27, at 342. There are, to be sure, other factors that
push Supreme Court opinions toward unanimity. See Brenner et al., supra note 55, at 252-53.
153. See SEGAL & SPAm-, supra note 107, at 262; see also PALMER, supra note 59, at 125;
Sue Davis, Power on the Court Chief Justice Rehnquist's Opinion Assignments, 74 JuDIcATuR
66 (1990); Harold J. Spaeth, Distributive Justice: Majority Opinion Assignments in the Burger
Cotrt, 67 JuDicAruRE 299, 301 (1984); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Use of Power on the Supreme
Court: The Opinion Assignments of Earl Warren, 1953-1960, 19 . PuB. L. 49, 53 (1970).
154. See, eg., WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 417-22.
155. Trm OxFoRD COMPANION TO THE SuPREmF COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 174
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
156. See WOODWARD & ARmSTRONG, supra note 5, at 189.
157. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (Blackmun, J.).
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negligible 0.4% theoretical chance of assigning a majority opinion. In-
deed, as far as we know, only once has the fourth most senior Associ-
ate Justice ever assigned a majority opinion.158 More junior members
of the Court, including reigning power pageant titlist Justice Ginsburg,
have no chance whatsoever of assigning a majority opinion.
Viewed in light of the Court's hierarchical structure and the
methods for setting the Court's agenda, our analysis of Supreme
Court voting suggests that there may be a trade-off between seniority
and voting power. Lloyd Shapley of Shapley-Shubik index fame de-
scribed the motivation of each voter in a collective decisionmaking
body as his or her marginal contribution to the building of a successful
coalition. 159 Voters with greater agenda-setting power will, a priori,
be disinclined to be swing voters. In other words, given a choice in
how the legal issues in a case might be framed, why should the Chief
Justice present the controversy in a way that risks a losing outcome?
Conversely, junior Associate Justices, having little or no agenda-set-
ting power, will find that the route to maximizing their influence on
the Court lies in aligning their political preferences with the Court's
ideological center of gravity and with developing a supple approach to
forming coalitions with their colleagues-precisely the traits that de-
fine powerful voting on the Supreme Court. With her accession dur-
ing the 1994 Term to the third most senior seat on the Court, Justice
O'Connor may have moved to a position of maximizing her power on
the Court through agenda control rather than through coalition-build-
ing. One of the 1995 Term's 5-4 decisions symbolizes this power in
particularly vivid terms: In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,16
Justice Ginsburg wrote for a five-Justice coalition led by Justice
O'Connor.
So it seems that the junior Justices heave the U.S.S. High Court's
heaviest harpoons primarily because they have yet to attain the rank
of a Captain Ahab. "[O]nly history can tell" when and how Justice
Kennedy discovers whether he is "Caesar at the Rubicon or Queeg
cutting [his] own tow line."'1 61 For her part, Justice Ginsburg has al-
ready seized more than her share of the "equal opportunity to aspire,
158. See Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982) (Blackmun, J., joined by Powell,
Rehnquist, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.).
159. See LLOYD S. SHAPLEY, A COMPARISON OF POWER INDICES AND A NONSYMMETRIC
GENERALZATION (Rand Corp. Paper No. P-5872, 1977).
160. 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., joined by O'connor, Kennedy, Souter & Breyer,
JJ.).
161. Carter, supra note 115, at 39-40 (quoting Kennedy).
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achieve, participate in and contribute to" the work of the Court.162 In
the meanwhile, lack of seniority makes powerful voting the only way
that Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg can boost their personal power
on the Court. The fault, junior Justices, is not in your stars, but in
yourselves, that you are underlings.163 But soft, what power through
yonder window breaks? It is the East, and Justice Ginsburg is the
sun.64 And fear not for Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg's once and
likely future rival for the title of Most Dangerous Justice. Call him
Ishmael: 65 As a perennial contender in the power pageant of the Jus-
tices, Justice Kennedy has also mastered the craft of voting with
power.
The ideological battle scars on the Justices' faces leave little
doubt that the currency of today's Supreme Court is "power, not rea-
son."' 66 Ironically, in the centennial year of William Jennings Bryan's
"Cross of Gold" speech,167 the Court's power flows in two streams of
contradictory currency: agenda-setting and voting. No less in the
Court's own decisionmaking dynamics than in the political controver-
sies that the Court mediates, "'[t]he tools belong to the [Justice] who
can use them.""' 168 Forewarned is forearmed: To the victor belong
only those spoils that are cleverly obtained. 69
162. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.).
163. Cf WILLAM SHAKESPEARE, JuLrus CxsAR act 1, sc. 2,11. 139-40 (Lawrence Mason ed.,
1959) ("The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, / But in ourselves, that we are underlings.").
164. Cf. WLUAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND Juu=r act II, sc. i, 11.47-48 (Richard Hosley
ed. 1954) ("But soft, what power through yonder window breaks? It is the East and Juliet is the
sun.").
165. Cf HE MAN MEL.LE, MOBY-DicK, OR, THE WHALE 3 (Harrison Hayford et al. eds.,
1988) ("Call me Ishmael.").
166. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Suzanna
Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEo. LJ. 453, 481 (1996) ("[l]f reason is not a universal episte-
mology that can mediate between... different beliefs, but only the belief system favored by the
powerful, then whoever is in power will reify his own epistemology.").
167. William Jennings Bryan, The Cross of Gold Speech (July 9,1896), in SELECTED AMERi.
CAN SPEECl-ES ON BAsiC IssuEs, 1850-1950, at 182 (Carl G. Brandt & Edward M. Shafter, Jr.
eds., 1960).
168. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
169. But cf. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 64 (1990) ("To the victor belong only
those spoils that may be constitutionally obtained.").
THE MOST DANGEROUS JUSTICE
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
In this appendix the mathematical formalism of the voting index
is discussed. Let X be the set of Supreme Court Justices. We con-
struct a collection of subsets of X in the following way: for each opin-
ion during the 1994 and 1995 Terms, we look at the set of Justices who
joined that opinion. Call this collection of subsets 0, the opinion set.
The opinion set is not a priori closed under intersection, i.e., it may
well happen that subsets A and B are both in 0 while Ar'B is not. Let
SC be the collection of subsets obtained by computing all intersections
of subsets in 0, i.e.,
SC = {A I A=0 1 rn 02 r) r° Ok, Oi 8 0}.
The collection SC is the collection of feasible coalitions defined above.
Let v be the function v : SC - R that identifies the winning coali-
tions. That is
v(A)= 1 if JAI _
The generalized Banzhaf index of each Justice x E X is calculated by
B(x) = - v(A)-v(A-x)
r AA-xeSC
r {AA-x II A 1=5}
where r is taken to normalize the sum so that E_, B (x) = 1.
We have encoded the data by assigning to each Justice a number
according to seniority, i.e., Chief Justice Rehnquist is assigned 1, Jus-
tice Stevens is assigned 2, etc. The data for the the 1994 Term are:
094 = {{2}, {3}, {4}, {6}, {7}, {8}, {9}, {1,4},
{1,7}, {2,6}, {2,8}, {3,5}, {3,6}, {3,7}, {3,9},
{4,5}, {4,7}, {6,9}, {8,9}, {1,3,6}, {1,4,7}, {1,5,7},
{2,3,6}, {2,7,9}, {2,8,9}, {3,6,9}, {3,8,9}, {4,5,7},
{6,8,9}, {1,3,4,7}, {1,3,7,9}, {1,4,5,7}, {1,4,6,7},
{2,3,6,9}, {2,5,6,8}, {2,5,8,9}, {2,6,8,9}, {3,4,6,7},
{4,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,5,6}, {1,2,5,6,8}, {1,2,5,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,7},
{1,3,4,7,9}, {1,4,5,7,8}, {1,5,6,8,9}, {2,3,5,8,9}, {2,3,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,6,8},
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{2,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,3,6,8,9}, {1,2,4,5,7,8}, {1,2,5,6,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,6,7}, {1,3,4,5,6,8}, {1,3,4,5,6,9}, {1,3,5,6,8,9},
{1,4,5,6,7,8}, {1,4,5,7,8,9}, {2,3,4,6,8,9}, {2,3,5,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,7,8,9},
{1,2,3,5,6,8,9},
{1,2,4,6,7,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,7,8,9}, {2,3,4,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9},
{1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}}
SC94 = { {}, {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, {7}, {8},
{9}, {1,2}, {1,3}, {1,4}, {1,5}, {1,6}, {1,7},
{1,8}, {1,9}, {2,3}, {2,4}, {2,5}, {2,6}, {2,7},
{2,8}, {2,9}, {3,4}, {3,5}, {3,6}, {3,7}, {3,8},
{3,9}, {4,5}, {4,6}, {4,7}, {4,8}, {4,9}, {5,6},
{5,7}, {5,8}, {5,9}, {6,7}, {6,8}, {6,9}, {7,8},
{7,9}, {8,9}, {1,2,4}, {1,2,5}, {1,2,6}, {1,2,7},
{1,2,8}, {1,2,9}, {1,3,4}, {1,3,5}, {1,3,6}, {1,3,7},
{1,3,8}, {1,3,9}, {1,4,5}, {1,4,6}, {1,4,7}, {1,4,8},
{1,4,9}, {1,5,6}, {1,5,7}, {1,5,8}, {1,5,9}, {1,6,7},
{1,6,8}, {1,6,9}, {1,7,8}, {1,7,9}, {1,8,9}, {2,3,5},
{2,3,6}, {2,3,9}, {2,4,5}, {2,4,6}, {2,4,7}, {2,4,8},
{2,4,9}, {2,5,6}, {2,5,7}, {2,5,8}, {2,5,9}, {2,6,8},
{2,6,9}, {2,7,8}, {2,7,9}, {2,8,9}, {3,4,5}, {3,4,6},
{3,4,7}, {3,4,8}, {3,4,9}, {3,5,6}, {3,5,8}, {3,5,9},
{3,6,7}, {3,6,8}, {3,6,9}, {3,8,9}, {4,5,6}, {4,5,7},
{4,5,8}, {4,5,9}, {4,6,7}, {4,6,8}, {4,6,9}, {4,7,8},
{4,7,9}, {4,8,9}, {5,6,8}, {5,6,9}, {5,7,8}, {5,7,9},
{5,8,9}, {6,8,9}, {7,8,9}, {1,2,3,6}, {1,2,4,5},
{1,2,4,7}, {1,2,4,8}, {1,2,5,6}, {1,2,5,7}, {1,2,5,8},
{1,2,5,9}, {1,2,6,8}, {1,2,6,9}, {1,2,7,8}, {1,2,8,9},
{1,3,4,5}, {1,3,4,7}, {1,3,4,9}, {1,3,5,6}, {1,3,5,7},
{1,3,5,8}, {1,3,5,9}, {1,3,6,8}, {1,3,6,9}, {1,3,7,9},
{1,3,8,9}, {1,4,5,6}, {1,4,5,7}, {1,4,5,8}, {1,4,5,9},
{1,4,6,7}, {1,4,6,8}, {1,4,6,9}, {1,4,7,8}, {1,4,7,9},
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{1,4,8,9}, {1,5,6,7}, {1,5,6,8}, {1,5,6,9}, {1,5,7,8},
{1,5,7,9}, {1,5,8,9}, {1,6,7,8}, {1,6,7,9}, {1,6,8,9},
{1,7,8,9}, {2,3,5,6}, {2,3,5,9}, {2,3,6,9}, {2,3,8,9},
{2,4,5,6}, {2,4,5,7}, {2,4,5,8}, {2,4,5,9}, {2,4,6,8},
{2,4,6,9}, {2,4,7,8}, {2,4,7,9}, {2,4,8,9}, {2,5,6,8},
{2,5,6,9}, {2,5,7,8}, {2,5,7,9}, {2,5,8,9}, {2,6,8,9},
{2,7,8,9}, {3,4,5,6}, {3,4,5,8}, {3,4,5,9}, {3,4,6,7},
{3,4,6,8}, {3,4,6,9}, {3,4,8,9}, {3,5,6,8}, {3,5,6,9},
{3,5,8,9}, {3,6,8,9}, {4,5,6,8}, {4,5,6,9}, {4,5,7,8},
{4,5,7,9}, {4,5,8,9}, {4,6,8,9}, {4,7,8,9}, {5,6,8,9},
{5,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,5,6}, {1,2,3,6,9}, {1,2,4,5,7},
{1,2,4,5,8}, {1,2,4,6,9}, {1,2,4,7,8}, {1,2,5,6,8},
{1,2,5,6,9}, {1,2,5,7,8}, {1,2,5,8,9}, {1,2,6,7,9},
{1,2,6,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,6}, {1,3,4,5,7}, {1,3,4,5,8},
{1,3,4,5,9}, {1,3,4,7,9}, {1,3,5,6,7}, {1,3,5,6,8},
{1,3,5,6,9}, {1,3,5,7,9}, {1,3,5,8,9}, {1,3,6,8,9},
{1,4,5,6,7}, {1,4,5,6,8}, {1,4,5,6,9}, {1,4,5,7,8},
{1,4,5,7,9}, {1,4,5,8,9}, {1,4,6,7,8}, {1,4,6,7,9},
{1,4,6,8,9}, {1,4,7,8,9}, {1,5,6,7,8}, {1,5,6,7,9},
{1,5,6,8,9}, {1,5,7,8,9}, {1,6,7,8,9}, {2,3,4,6,9},
{2,3,5,6,9}, {2,3,5,8,9}, {2,3,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,6,8},
{2,4,5,6,9}, {2,4,5,7,8}, {2,4,5,7,9}, {2,4,5,8,9},
{2,4,6,8,9}, {2,4,7,8,9}, {2,5,6,8,9}, {2,5,7,8,9},
{3,4,5,6,8}, {3,4,5,6,9}, {3,4,5,8,9}, {3,4,6,8,9},
{3,5,6,8,9}, {4,5,6,8,9}, {4,5,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,5,6,9},
{1,2,3,6,8,9}, {1,2,4,5,6,9}, {1,2,4,5,7,8}, {1,2,4,6,7,9},
{1,2,4,6,8,9}, {1,2,5,6,7,9}, {1,2,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,6,7,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,6,7}, {1,3,4,5,6,8}, {1,3,4,5,6,9}, {1,3,4,5,7,9},
{1,3,4,5,8,9}, {1,3,5,6,7,9}, {1,3,5,6,8,9}, {1,3,5,7,8,9},
{1,4,5,6,7,8}, {1,4,5,6,7,9}, {1,4,5,6,8,9}, {1,4,5,7,8,9},
{1,4,6,7,8,9}, {1,5,6,7,8,9}, {2,3,4,5,6,9}, {2,3,4,6,8,9},
{2,3,5,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,7,8,9}, {3,4,5,6,8,9},
1996]
106 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:63
{1,2,3,4,5,6,9}, {1,2,3,5,6,7,9}, {1,2,3,5,6,8,9},
{1,2,4,5,6,7,9}, {1,2,4,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,4,6,7,8,9},
{1,2,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,6,7,9}, {1,3,4,5,6,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,7,8,9}, {1,3,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,4,5,6,7,8,9},
{2,3,4,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9},
{1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9},
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}}.
The data for the 1995 Term are:
095 = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, {7}, {8}, {9},
{1,4}, {1,5}, {1,7}, {1,8}, {2,5}, {2,7}, {2,8},
{2,9}, {3,4}, {3,9}, {4,7}, {4,9}, {5,8}, {5,9},
{6,8}, {6,9}, {8,9}, {1,3,5}, {1,3,7}, {1,4,5},
{1,4,7}, {2,5,8}, {2,6,8}, {2,6,9}, {2,8,9}, {3,4,7},
{3,6,9}, {4,5,7}, {6,8,9}, {1,3,4,7}, {1,3,6,9},
{1,4,5,7}, {2,3,6,9}, {2,5,6,8}, {2,5,7,8}, {2,6,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,7}, {1,3,4,6,7}, {1,3,4,7,8}, {2,3,5,6,9},
{2,3,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,6,8}, {2,5,6,8,9}, {3,5,6,8,9},
{1,2,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,7}, {1,3,4,6,7,9}, {1,3,5,6,8,9},
{1,4,5,6,7,8}, {2,3,5,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,6,7,8}, {2,4,5,6,8,9},
{1,2,3,4,5,7,8}, {1,2,3,5,6,7,8}, {1,2,3,5,6,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,6,7,8}, {1,3,4,5,6,7,9}, {1,3,4,5,6,8,9},
{1,3,4,6,7,8,9}, {2,3,4,5,6,8,9}, {2,3,5,6,7,8,9},
{1,2,3,4,516,8,9}, {1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9},
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}}
and
SC95={{}, {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, {7}, {8},
{9}, {1,3}, {1,4}, {1,5}, {1,6}, {1,7}, {1,8},
{2,3}, {2,5}, {2,6}, {2,7}, {2,8}, {2,9}, {3,4},
{3,5}, {3,6}, {3,7}, {3,8}, {3,9}, {4,5}, {4,6},
{4,7}, {4,8}, {4,9}, {5,6}, {5,7}, {5,8}, {5,9},
{6,7}, {6,8}, {6,9}, {7,8}, {8,9}, {1,2,5}, {1,3,4},
{1,3,5}, {1,3,6}, {1,3,7}, {1,3,8}, {1,4,5}, {1,4,6},
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{1,4,7}, {1,4,8}, {1,5,6}, {1,5,7}, {1,5,8}, {1,6,7},
{1,6,8}, {1,6,9}, {1,7,8}, {2,3,5}, {2,3,6}, {2,3,8},
{2,4,5}, {2,5,6}, {2,5,7}, {2,5,8}, {2,6,8}, {2,6,9},
{2,8,9}, {3,4,5}, {3,4,6}, {3,4,7}, {3,4,8}, {3,5,6},
{3,5,7}, {3,5,8}, {3,6,7}, {3,6,8}, {3,6,9}, {3,7,8},
{4,5,6}, {4,5,7}, {4,5,8}, {4,6,7}, {4,6,8}, {4,6,9},
{4,7,8}, {5,6,7}, {5,6,8}, {5,6,9}, {5,7,8}, {6,7,8},
{6,8,9}, {1,2,3,5}, {1,2,5,8}, {1,3,4,5}, {1,3,4,6},
{1,3,4,7}, {1,3,4,8}, {1,3,5,6}, {1,3,5,7}, {1,3,5,8},
{1,3,6,7}, {1,3,6,8}, {1,3,6,9}, {1,3,7,8}, {1,4,5,6},
{1,4,5,7}, {1,4,5,8}, {1,4,6,7}, {1,4,6,8}, {1,4,7,8},
{1,5,6,7}, {1,5,6,8}, {1,5,6,9}, {1,5,7,8}, {1,6,7,8},
{1,6,8,9}, {2,3,4,5}, {2,3,5,6}, {2,3,5,7}, {2,3,5,8},
{2,3,6,8}, {2,3,6,9}, {2,4,5,7}, {2,4,5,8}, {2,5,6,8},
{2,5,6,9}, {2,5,7,8}, {2,6,8,9}, {3,4,5,6}, {3,4,5,8},
{3,4,6,8}, {3,4,6,9}, {3,5,6,7}, {3,5,6,8}, {3,5,6,9},
{3,5,7,8}, {3,6,7,8}, {3,6,7,9}, {3,6,8,9}, {4,5,6,7},
{4,5,6,8}, {4,5,6,9}, {4,5,7,8}, {4,6,7,8}, {4,6,8,9},
{5,6,7,8}, {5,6,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5}, {1,2,3,5,7}, {1,2,3,5,8},
{1,2,5,6,8}, {1,3,4,5,6}, {1,3,4,5,7}, {1,3,4,5,8},
{1,3,4,6,7}, {1,3,4,6,8}, {1,3,4,6,9}, {1,3,4,7,8},
{1,3,5,6,7}, {1,3,5,6,8}, {1,3,5,6,9}, {1,3,5,7,8},
{1,3,6,7,8}, {1,3,6,7,9}, {1,3,6,8,9}, {1,4,5,6,7},
{1,4,5,6,8}, {1,4,5,7,8}, {1,4,6,7,8}, {1,5,6,7,8},
{1,5,6,8,9}, {2,3,4,5,8}, {2,3,5,6,8}, {2,3,5,6,9},
{2,3,5,7,8}, {2,3,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,6,8}, {2,4,5,7,8},
{2,5,6,7,8}, {2,5,6,8,9}, {3,4,5,6,8}, {3,4,5,6,9},
{3,4,6,8,9}, {3,5,6,7,8}, {3,5,6,7,9}, {3,5,6,8,9},
{3,6,7,8,9}, {4,5,6,7,8}, {4,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,7},
{1,2,3,4,5,8}, {1,2,3,5,6,8}, {1,2,3,5,7,8}, {1,2,5,6,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,6,7}, {1,3,4,5,6,8}, {1,3,4,5,6,9}, {1,3,4,5,7,8},
{1,3,4,6,7,8}, {1,3,4,6,7,9}, {1,3,4,6,8,9}, {1,3,5,6,7,8},
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{1,3,5,6,7,9}, {1,3,5,6,8,9}, {1,3,6,7,8,9}, {1,4,5,6,7,8},
{2,3,5,6,7,8}, {2,3,5,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,6,7,8}, {2,4,5,6,8,9},
{3,4,5,6,8,9}, {3,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,7,8}, {1,2,3,5,6,7,8},
{1,2,3,5,6,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,6,7,8}, {1,3,4,5,6,7,9},
{1,3,4,5,6,8,9}, {1,3,4,6,7,8,9}, {1,3,5,6,7,8,9},
{2,3,4,5,6,8,9}, {2,3,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9},
{1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}}.
For the union of the two Terms
094-95={{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, {7}, {8}, {9},
{1,4}, {1,5}, {1,7}, {1,8}, {2,5}, {2,6}, {2,7},
{2,8}, {2,9}, {3,4}, {3,5}, {3,6}, {3,7}, {3,9},
{4,5}, {4,7}, {4,9}, {5,8}, {5,9}, {6,8}, {6,9},
{8,9}, {1,3,5}, {1,3,6}, {1,3,7}, {1,4,5}, {1,4,7},
{1,5,7}, {2,3,6}, {2,5,8}, {2,6,8}, {2,6,9}, {2,7,9},
{2,8,9}, {3,4,7}, {3,6,9}, {3,8,9}, {4,5,7}, {6,8,9},
{1,3,4,7}, {1,3,6,9}, {1,3,7,9}, {1,4,5,7}, {1,4,6,7},
{2,3,6,9}, {2,5,6,8}, {2,5,7,8}, {2,5,8,9}, {2,6,8,9},
{3,4,6,7}, {4,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,5,6}, {1,2,5,6,8}, {1,2,5,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,7}, {1,3,4,6,7}, {1,3,4,7,8}, {1,3,4,7,9},
{1,4,5,7,8}, {1,5,6,7,8}, {2,3,5,6,9}, {2,3,5,8,9},
{2,3,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,6,8}, {2,5,6,8,9}, {3,5,6,8,9},
{1,2,3,4,5,7}, {1,2,3,6,8,9}, {1,2,4,5,7,8}, {1,2,5,6,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,6,7}, {1,3,4,5,6,8}, {1,3,4,5,6,9}, {1,3,4,6,7,9},
{1,3,5,6,8,9}, {1,4,5,6,7,8}, {1,4,5,7,8,9}, {2,3,4,6,8,9},
{2,3,5,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,6,7,8}, {2,4,5,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,7,8,9},
{1,2,3,4,5,7,8}, {1,2,3,5,6,7,8}, {1,2,3,5,6,8,9},
{1,2,4,6,7,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,6,7,8}, {1,3,4,5,6,7,9},
{1,3,4,5,6,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,7,8,9}, {1,3,4,6,7,8,9},
{2,3,4,5,6,8,9}, {2,3,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9},
{1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}}.
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SC94-95= {{}, {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, {7}, {8},
{9}, {1,2}, {1,3}, {1,4}, {1,5}, {1,6}, {1,7},
{1,8}, {1,9}, {2,3}, {2,4}, {2,5}, {2,6}, {2,7},
{2,8}, {2,9}, {3,4}, {3,5}, {3,6}, {3,7}, {3,8},
{3,9}, {4,5}, {4,6}, {4,7}, {4,8}, {4,9}, {5,6},
{5,7}, {5,8}, {5,9}, {6,7}, {6,8}, {6,9}, {7,8},
{7,9}, {8,9}, {1,2,3}, {1,2,4}, {1,2,5}, {1,2,6},
{1,2,8}, {1,2,9}, {1,3,4},
{1,3,8}, {1,3,9}, {1,4,5},
{1,4,9}, {1,5,6}, {1,5,7},
{1,6,8}, {1,6,9}, {1,7,8},
{2,3,5}, {2,3,6}, {2,3,8},
{2,4,7}, {2,4,8}, {2,4,9},
{2,5,9}, {2,6,7}, {2,6,8},
{2,8,9}, {3,4,5}, {3,4,6},
{3,5,6}, {3,5,7}, {3,5,8},
{3,6,9}, {3,7,8}, {3,7,9},
{4,5,8}, {4,5,9}, {4,6,7},
{4,7,9}, {4,8,9}, {5,6,7},
{5,7,9}, {5,8,9}, {6,7,8},
{1,3,5}, {1,3,6},
{1,4,6}, {1,4,7},
{1,5,8}, {1,5,9},
{1,7,9}, {1,8,9},
{2,3,9}, {2,4,5},
{2,5,6}, {2,5,7},
{2,6,9}, {2,7,8},
{3,4,7}, {3,4,8},
{3,5,9}, {3,6,7},
{3,8,9}, {4,5,6},
{4,6,8}, {4,6,9},
{5,6,8}, {5,6,9},
{6,7,9}, {6,8,9},
{7,8,9}, {1,2,3,5}, {1,2,3,6}, {1,2,3,8}, {1,2,4,5},
{1,2,4,7}, {1,2,4,8},
{1,2,5,9}, {1,2,6,7},
{1,2,8,9}, {1,3,4,5},
{1,3,4,9}, {1,3,5,6},
{1,3,6,7}, {1,3,6,8},
{1,3,8,9}, {1,4,5,6},
{1,4,6,7}, {1,4,6,8},
{1,4,8,9}, {1,5,6,7},
{1,5,7,9}, {1,5,8,9},
{1,2,5,6}, {1,2,5,7}, {1,2,5,8},
{1,2,6,8}, {1,2,6,9}, {1,2,7,8},
{1,3,4,6}, {1,3,4,7}, {1,3,4,8},
{1,3,5,7}, {1,3,5,8}, {1,3,5,9},
{1,3,6,9}, {1,3,7,8}, {1,3,7,9},
{1,4,5,7}, {1,4,5,8}, {1,4,5,9},
{1,4,6,9}, {1,4,7,8}, {1,4,7,9},
{1,5,6,8}, {1,5,6,9}, {1,5,7,8},
{1,6,7,8}, {1,6,7,9}, {1,6,8,9},
{1,7,8,9}, {2,3,4,5}, {2,3,4,8}, {2,3,5,6}, {2,3,5,7},
{1,2,7},
{1,3,7},
{1,4,8},
{1,6,7},
{2,3,4},
{2,4,6},
{2,5,8},
{2,7,9},
{3,4,9},
{3,6,8},
{4,5,7},
{4,7,8},
{5,7,8},
1996]
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{2,3,5,8}, {2,3,5,9}, {2,3,6,8}, {2,3,6,9}, {2,3,8,9},
{2,4,5,6}, {2,4,5,7}, {2,4,5,8}, {2,4,5,9}, {2,4,6,7},
{2,4,6,8}, {2,4,6,9}, {2,4,7,8}, {2,4,7,9}, {2,4,8,9},
{2,5,6,7}, {2,5,6,8}, {2,5,6,9}, {2,5,7,8}, {2,5,7,9},
{2,5,8,9}, {2,6,7,8}, {2,6,7,9}, {2,6,8,9}, {2,7,8,9},
{3,4,5,6}, {3,4,5,8}, {3,4,5,9}, {3,4,6,7}, {3,4,6,8},
{3,4,6,9}, {3,4,8,9}, {3,5,6,7}, {3,5,6,8}, {3,5,6,9},
{3,5,7,8}, {3,5,7,9}, {3,5,8,9}, {3,6,7,8}, {3,6,7,9},
{3,6,8,9}, {3,7,8,9}, {4,5,6,7}, {4,5,6,8}, {4,5,6,9},
{4,5,7,8}, {4,5,7,9}, {4,5,8,9}, {4,6,7,8}, {4,6,8,9},
{4,7,8,9}, {5,6,7,8}, {5,6,7,9}, {5,6,8,9}, {5,7,8,9},
{6,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5}, {1,2,3,5,6}, {1,2,3,5,7},
{1,2,3,5,8}, {1,2,3,6,8}, {1,2,3,6,9}, {1,2,4,5,7},
{1,2,4,5,8}, {1,2,4,6,9}, {1,2,4,7,8}, {1,2,5,6,7},
{1,2,5,6,8}, {1,2,5,6,9}, {1,2,5,7,8}, {1,2,5,8,9},
{1,2,6,7,8}, {1,2,6,7,9}, {1,2,6,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,6},
{1,3,4,5,7}, {1,3,4,5,8}, {1,3,4,5,9}, {1,3,4,6,7},
{1,3,4,6,8}, {1,3,4,6,9}, {1,3,4,7,8}, {1,3,4,7,9},
{1,3,4,8,9}, {1,3,5,6,7}, {1,3,5,6,8}, {1,3,5,6,9},
{1,3,5,7,8}, {1,3,5,7,9}, {1,3,5,8,9}, {1,3,6,7,8},
{1,3,6,7,9}, {1,3,6,8,9}, {1,3,7,8,9}, {1,4,5,6,7},
{1,4,5,6,8}, {1,4,5,6,9}, {1,4,5,7,8}, {1,4,5,7,9},
{1,4,5,8,9}, {1,4,6,7,8}, {1,4,6,7,9}, {1,4,6,8,9},
{1,4,7,8,9}, {1,5,6,7,8}, {1,5,6,7,9}, {1,5,6,8,9},
{1,5,7,8,9}, {1,6,7,8,9}, {2,3,4,5,8}, {2,3,4,6,9},
{2,3,5,6,7}, {2,3,5,6,8}, {2,3,5,6,9}, {2,3,5,7,8},
{2,3,5,8,9}, {2,3,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,6,7}, {2,4,5,6,8},
{2,4,5,6,9}, {2,4,5,7,8}, {2,4,5,7,9}, {2,4,5,8,9},
{2,4,6,7,8}, {2,4,6,8,9}, {2,4,7,8,9}, {2,5,6,7,8},
{2,5,6,7,9}, {2,5,6,8,9}, {2,5,7,8,9}, {2,6,7,8,9},
{3,4,5,6,8}, {3,4,5,6,9}, {3,4,5,8,9}, {3,4,6,8,9},
{3,5,6,7,8}, {3,5,6,7,9}, {3,5,6,8,9}, {3,5,7,8,9},
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{3,6,7,8,9}, {4,5,6,7,8}, {4,5,6,8,9}, {4,5,7,8,9},
{5,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,7}, {1,2,3,4,5,8}, {1,2,3,5,6,7},
{1,2,3,5,6,8}, {1,2,3,5,6,9}, {1,2,3,5,7,8}, {1,2,3,6,8,9},
{1,2,4,5,6,9}, {1,2,4,5,7,8}, {1,2,4,6,7,9}, {1,2,4,6,8,9},
{1,2,5,6,7,8}, {1,2,5,6,7,9}, {1,2,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,6,7,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,6,7}, {1,3,4,5,6,8}, {1,3,4,5,6,9}, {1,3,4,5,7,8},
{1,3,4,5,7,9}, {1,3,4,5,8,9}, {1,3,4,6,7,8}, {1,3,4,6,7,9},
{1,3,4,6,8,9}, {1,3,4,7,8,9}, {1,3,5,6,7,8}, {1,3,5,6,7,9},
{1,3;5,6,8,9}, {1,3,5,7,8,9}, {1,3,6,7,8,9}, {1,4,5,6,7,8},
{1,4,5,6,7,9}, {1,4,5,6,8,9}, {1,4,5,7,8,9}, {1,4,6,7,8,9},
{1,5,6,7,8,9}, {2,3,4,5,6,9}, {2,3,4,6,8,9}, {2,3,5,6,7,8},
{2,3,5,6,7,9}, {2,3,5,6,8,9}, {2,4,5,6,7,8}, {2,4,5,6,8,9},
{2,4,5,7,8,9}, {2,5,6,7,8,9}, {3,4,5,6,8,9}, {3,5,6,7,8,9},
{1,2,3,4,5,6,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,7,8}, {1,2,3,5,6,7,8},
{1,2,3,5,6,7,9}, {1,2,3,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,4,5,6,7,9},
{1,2,4,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,4,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,5,6,7,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,6,7,8}, {1,3,4,5,6,7,9}, {1,3,4,5,6,8,9},
{1,3,4,5,7,8,9}, {1,3,4,6,7,8,9}, {1,3,5,6,7,8,9},
{1,4,5,6,7,8,9}, {2,3,4,5,6,8,9}, {2,3,5,6,7,8,9},
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9}, {1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9},
{1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}, {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}}.
The most computationally difficult part of the foregoing analysis
is the production of the feasible set SC from the opinion set 0. This
was accomplisted through a script written by the first author in
Mathematica®, a commercially available symbolic manipulation
package.
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